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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION  
The Role of Knowledge for Policy Preferences: 
Evidence from Argentina 
by  
Alexandra Petrachkova  
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
 Professor Daniel Simon Treisman, Chair 
 
In this dissertation, I study the role of knowledge in policy preferences. In democracies, voters 
are often criticized for not being sufficiently informed when making their political decisions. 
Political scientists disagree about how consequential this ignorance is for the quality of 
democratic government. One camp emphasizes that people are capable of learning new 
information and that knowledge makes them change their views. Following this line of 
reasoning, I suggest using fundamental knowledge relevant to a specific policy domain rather 
than measuring knowledge that is directly related to the political world. 
I focus on one policy domain – economic policies. I use the Global Financial Literacy test 
developed by Standard & Poor’s as a proxy for economic knowledge. I ask respondents to 
complete this test at the end of the three original surveys that I conducted in Argentina in 2017, 
2018, and 2019. In total, 10,457 individuals participated in the surveys. I choose this country to 
study the effect of knowledge on policy preferences because of a drastic change in economic 
policies in 2015.  
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I find that those who score higher on the test are more likely to support pro-market 
economic policies, such as elimination of trade barriers, elimination of subsidies, and integration 
into the world financial markets. My identification strategy includes using a measure of 
knowledge that is uncorrelated with the most important driver for policy preferences – partisan 
attachments- and conducting analysis in two different contexts – economic boom and recession. 
The latter helps address possible confoundedness between financial knowledge and other factors, 
such as social status, that are important both for knowledge and policy preferences.  
In addition to observational evidence, I provide randomly selected respondents in the 
2018 and 2019 surveys with survey treatments – passages in which consequences of economic 
policies in Argentina and Venezuela are discussed. The results largely support the view that 
information helps shape policy positions. I receive stronger results in 2018 than in 2019. In 2018, 
I find that respondents who received the treatment are more likely to support the open economy 
and the debt repayment. In 2019, the coefficients for the treatment dummies do not reach a 
conventional level of significance, although their signs are consistent with the hypothesis.  
Overall, my findings suggest that fundamental non-partisan knowledge matters when it 
comes to policy preferences. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
In a democracy, citizens are expected to feel comfortable with many complicated issues of the 
day. Individuals are routinely asked about their attitudes toward free trade, international affairs, 
the role of technology, social policies, or environmental problems. Evidence shows that people’s 
opinions are superficial and unstable (Berelson et al., 1954, Campbell et al., 1960, Converse, 
1964, Zaller, 1992). Researchers suggest that what people often lack to form genuine opinions is 
knowledge (Somin, 2006, Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Many studies aim to evaluate the 
effect of knowledge and information on political decisions (Gilens, 2001, Bullock, 2011, Bartels, 
2002). In doing so, they usually use measures of knowledge directly related to the political world 
– general political knowledge or knowledge of policy-specific facts.  
I suggest going one step back and estimating the effect of more basic and fundamental 
knowledge on political preferences. My idea is simple. If someone has studied the greenhouse 
effect, this knowledge may be useful for a discussion about climate change. If one can locate 
Syria on a map, it might help to organize her thoughts about the nature of the conflict. If one 
knows how to calculate percentages, it is probably easier to form an opinion about the degree of 
state intervention in the economy. 
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In this dissertation, I study the effect of specific knowledge on a specific policy domain. 
In particular, I am interested in the role of economic knowledge in economic policy preferences. 
My primary research questions are as follows: Do people with relevant knowledge have 
preferences different from those who remain ignorant? Can people learn new information and 
update their preferences? In what way are knowledgeable people different from the rest of the 
population? 
 
1.2 The Argument 
 
My central argument is that knowledge matters when it comes to policy preferences. Following 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), I define knowledge as a range of factual information about a 
certain knowledge domain stored in long-term memory. This fundamental knowledge is relevant 
to a policy domain but is not necessarily directly related to any political issue in question. I focus 
on one policy domain – economic policies. I am interested in the role of economic knowledge in 
economic policy preferences.  
There is an ongoing debate in political science about how much and what exactly citizens 
should know to make meaningful political choices. Some scholars argue that the public can rely 
on the endorsements of ―enlightened educators‖ to arrive at political judgments similar to those 
they would have reached if they were ―well informed‖ (Lupia, 1994). Lupia (2015) notes that the 
US Congress passes, in an average year, around 200 bills into law - and this is just at the national 
level - while there are many other regulations that may affect citizens’ lives. For him, it is 
unrealistic to expect that citizens examine in detail the vast majority of these rules. Other 
researchers argue that ―educators‖ often have incentives to manipulate, disguise, and misinform. 
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For them, we should not give up in our attempt to educate the public because better informed 
citizens make different and probably better political choices (Hochschild and Einstein, 2015). 
Better educated citizenry leads to higher quality democracy (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). It 
can happen through several mechanisms. For example, Cook et al. (2010) exploit the natural 
experiment to show that citizens who become more informed about government activities tend to 
trust more government institutions. Caplan (2011) argues that popular misconceptions are the 
greatest obstacle to sound economic policy. For him, the most direct path to make democratic 
governments work better is to correct people’s biases about economic policies. In a review essay, 
Pande (2011) summarizes that information about political process and political performance 
improves electoral accountability. 
Why is it difficult to acquire knowledge and apply it to the formation of political 
opinions? Lupia (2015) mentions the main reason: there is too much to learn. People are too busy 
with their daily routines to keep track and think about issues of the day, unless they find politics 
entertaining (Zaller, 1992). Politicians compete for people’s attention, and when they are 
successful, they are able to convey their agenda. As a result, we learn only pieces of information. 
Thaler (2019) summarizes three stages in which biases may arise: people may have had different 
priors, they may perceive differently the informativeness of the news, or they may have different 
inference processes (motivated reasoning). When they do acquire some knowledge, even if it is 
wrong, it becomes very difficult to change their minds (Hochschild and Einstein, 2015, Flynn et 
al., 2017, Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). Sometimes even if they correct factual knowledge, that does 
not always translate into an update of preferences (Barrera et al., 2019).  
Our understanding of the process of knowledge acquisition helps acknowledge why it is 
difficult to educate people about political matters. Two widely recognized models of 
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communication developed by psychologists – the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) and the 
heuristic-systematic model (HSM) – suggest that an individual engaged in information 
processing either carefully considers the content of a message or instead relies on other cues 
related to the message or messenger (Petty and Cacioppo, 1980, Chaiken, 1987). When it comes 
to inherently complex political world, it is rare for an individual to engage in thoughtful 
elaboration of the true merits of information presented to her to form a political opinion. Most 
people are not experts in most political issues of the day. More often, they rely on shortcuts, such 
as party labels, leaders, group identities, when taking positions on issues. As Lupia and 
McCubbins (1998) put it, people choose what and from whom to learn. 
When political scientists are concerned with the question about the effect of knowledge 
on political outcomes, they usually use two measures of individual competence that are directly 
related to politics, political knowledge, or knowledge of policy-specific facts. Although these 
measures aim to evaluate objectively the amount of factual knowledge in one’s head, they 
contain biases that originate in the process of knowledge acquisition.  
The first measure, political knowledge, is often defined as knowledge of facts about the 
political world, such as who represents one’s region in the parliament or who has the right to 
declare a war. Political knowledge test scores tell more about the exposure to elite 
communication than about the importance of knowledge itself (Zaller, 1992). In a recent study in 
Argentina, Lupu et al. (2019) also find that politically knowledgeable people are more likely to 
associate themselves with political parties. Political knowledge is an amalgam of engagement, 
interest, and cognitive capacity to understand politics. It is not political knowledge that shapes 
political preferences but rather a combination of these elements. We should take this into account 
when we interpret the results of studies that aim to measure the effect of political knowledge on 
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preferences. These studies are observational because it is hard to experimentally manipulate this 
kind of knowledge. Examples include the study of Popkin and Dimock (2000), who find that 
citizens more informed about political institutions are less likely to fear new immigrants and 
their impact on the country’s economy. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) find evidence that 
specific knowledge of civil rights and civil liberties increases tolerance for unpopular minorities. 
Bartels (2007) argues that Americans would not support the 2001 and 2002 Bush tax cuts if they 
were better politically informed.
1
 Althaus (1998) simulated from the original survey data what 
collective preferences would look like if the public were ―fully informed‖. The average change 
was 7 percentage points, with greater impact on fiscal policy questions. ―Fully informed‖ 
individuals would prefer to pay more taxes to increase government spending and reduce the 
deficit. 
The second measure is knowledge of policy-specific facts. On an individual level, such 
knowledge is often skewed toward one point of view or another because people have difficulty 
learning facts that go against their group loyalties. Bartels (2002) quotes the 1988 and 2000 
National Election Surveys (NES) in which individuals were asked batteries of factual questions 
about the Reagan and Clinton administrations, respectively (such as whether unemployment, 
inflation, the crime rate, etc. increased, decreased, or remained the same). Both presidents were 
successful in improving these macro conditions. However, Democrats in the first survey were 
reluctant to admit that unemployment and inflation decreased during the Reagan times. 
Republicans (even the best informed) were a lot less willing to agree that Clinton significantly 
reduced the budget deficit.  
                                                          
1
 With the same data Lupia et al. (2007) show that Bartels’s claim is true only for Democratic respondents. 
Knowledgeable liberals and Democrats showed less support for tax cuts than did people with similar party 
identification but less information. 
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But suppose one has learned correct facts on a relevant issue. Does it change her 
perspective on this issue? Barrera et al. (2019) demonstrate that it is not always the case. In a 
randomized online experiment they expose subgroups of French voters to fact-checking of 
claims made by the extreme-right candidate Marine Le Pen. They find that the exposure to facts 
alone does not decrease the support of the candidate, although people do correct their knowledge. 
Their explanation for this puzzle is that the discussion about immigration raises the salience of 
this issue, and Le Pen gains support because immigration is central in her campaign. However, 
other studies show that knowledge does shape preferences. Bullock (2011) conducts two 
experiments in which participants are given texts about a policy debate – healthcare benefits for 
the poor – with or without party cues and finds that ―attitudes seem to be affected at least as 
much by that information as by cues from party elites‖ and ―party cues do not inhibit thinking 
[about policies].‖ Gilens (2001) demonstrates that providing respondents with policy-specific 
facts, such as the direction of change in the crime rate, foreign aid, or unemployment, changes 
their political judgments ―they would hold otherwise.‖ Scholars who conducted studies outside 
the US come to similar conclusions. In the Deliberative Poll, the British exposed to a 
conversation about rising crime changed their mind about the issue (Luskin et al., 2002). Italians 
who learn about the pension reform in the experimental intervention are more willing to support 
it (Boeri and Tabellini, 2012). Civic Education Program in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo changed participants’ knowledge of the decentralization process in the country and 
through it their attitudes towards this issue (Finkel and Rojo-Mendoza, 2012). In a review essay, 
Gerber and Green (1999) conclude that we have more evidence that people with different 
preconceptions update their beliefs in accordance with Bayesian logic (in the same direction and 
by approximately the same extent, regardless of partisan ties) than that they do so in accordance 
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with the logic of biased learning. More generally, Hochschild and Einstein (2015) argue that 
―information may offset motivated reasoning or partisan framing rather than being put on their 
service‖. 
Researchers who study the effect of knowledge for politically-neutral scientifically-
driven issues come to similar conclusions. Information not only helps people improve their level 
of knowledge but actually changes their behavior.
2
 For example, environmental awareness and 
concern is enough for somebody to participate in waste recycling (Aini et al., 2002). Knowledge 
deficiency causes vaccine negativity (Krishna, 2018). Awareness of risk factors of smoking 
resulted in the decline of the number of smokers around the world (Link and Phelan, 2009).
3
 
My work is related to the literature that studies the role of knowledge for political 
outcomes but differs in one important way. Instead of focusing on political knowledge or 
knowledge of policy-specific facts, I focus on fundamental knowledge that helps people 
critically treat information related to a policy domain and understand causal relationships. This 
knowledge is very likely to have been acquired in a classroom or through life experience in a 
politically neutral context. In the psychological framework of information processing, this means 
that argument quality was more important than superficial cues. When a professor teaches a 
student how to calculate percentages, the student just tries to understand and learn this 
information with minimal resistance. If this knowledge is relevant to policy choices, it 
                                                          
2
 In several experimental studies, Brendan Nyhan shows that behavior does not necessarily change, even when 
misperceptions are corrected. For example, Nyhan and Reifler (2017) demonstrate that corrective information about 
flu vaccine safety reduces beliefs in the myth that this vaccine can give one the flu but also reduces intent to 
vaccinate. Nyhan et al. (2014) test the effectiveness of different interventions (texts, images, dramatic narratives) on 
the reduction of misperceptions about the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine. Some interventions were effective for 
correcting misperceptions but not for enhancing the decision to vaccinate. Carey et al. (2020) show that corrective 
information helps reduce misperceptions about yellow fever (but not Zika). However, updated knowledge does not 
affect support for preventive policies. 
3
 Another explanation for this change in behavior can be the agreement of the elites on the issue. In this situation, 
people are exposed to only one point of view. They learn to understand the issue in a way elites want them to 
through cue taking (Zaller, 1992). 
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potentially becomes a more powerful tool for assessing the role of knowledge in policy 
preferences and a more efficient way to educate the public. 
 
1.2.1 Focus on preferences 
 
I choose preferences as the main dependent variable because they are a starting point in the logic 
of a democratic theory. According to this theory, people develop genuine preferences that reflect 
their interests. Then, they choose parties that are committed to converting these preferences into 
policy choices. They elect politicians who promise to implement these policies and make 
politicians accountable if they fail to do so. Although the evidence suggests that positions on 
issues rarely become a driver for choosing parties and politicians, theoretically, preferences 
remain the core characteristic that describes the relations of an individual with a political world. 
In a democracy, there are no institutions that directly translate people’s preferences into 
policies (Manin et al., 1999). In theory, people could hold politicians accountable for failure to 
provide policies they prefer. Evidence suggests that they do not always use this tool and continue 
electing politicians who promised one set of policies in a campaign and then switched to very 
different ones (Stokes, 2001). Since the dawn of public opinion research, we know that voters 
often are largely not aware of their preferred politicians’ positions on issues of (Converse, 1964). 
Politicians spend more time trying to get more votes in the next election by providing better 
economic performance rather than communicating their policy agenda. Under certain conditions, 
people change their preferences. This change is usually elite-driven. Voters adopt their preferred 
politicians’ positions as their own, when they do learn them (Lenz, 2013, Druckman and Lupia, 
2016). In this case, individual preferences would be biased. However, among all variables that 
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describe interactions between voters and politicians, preferences, arguably, remain the least 
manipulated one. 
Theoretically and empirically, one can expect that knowledge would play a greater role in 
preference formation than in other political outcomes, such as party identification or voting 
decisions. Therefore, it would be easier to estimate the effect of knowledge on preferences than 
on other variables in which political scientists are usually interested.  
  Our understanding of the functioning of a democracy comes mostly from the developed 
world, the US in particular. Lupu et al. (2019), who attempt to build a theory of voter behavior in 
developing democracies, argue that, ―at their most basic level, voting decisions in developing 
democracies generally follow logics that are similar to those in advanced democracies.‖ 
Specifically, voters base their choices on some combination of group identity (including parties), 
issue positions, performance consideration, and campaign persuasion. The weight of each 
element depends on a context and individual characteristics. Because parties are often weak and 
politicians’ issue positions are vague, performance considerations and campaigns may play a 
more important role than they do in advanced democracies (Greene, 2011, Lewis-Beck and 
Ratto, 2013). However, if some voters happen to be partisans or they develop preferences, the 
behavioral logic underlying these considerations remains similar to that in developed countries. 
The evidence about the importance of voters’ issue positions in Latin America is mixed. Baker 
and Greene (2011) argue about the existence of ―well-reasoned voting on economic policy issues 
and electoral mandates [to pursue these policies].‖ McCann and Lawson (2003) demonstrate lack 
of stability in policy attitudes among Mexicans. Lupu et al. (2019) conclude that the discussion 
about policy areas played a very limited role for the majority of voters in the 2015 presidential 
campaign in Argentina.  
10 
 
1.3 Why Argentina? 
 
A drastic change in economic policies that occurred in Argentina from the 2011-2015 
administration to the 2016-2019 administration allows me to estimate more precisely individual 
preferences for these policies. Each individual had an opportunity to compare two very different 
sets of policies and evaluate their effect on her well-being and on the economy as a whole.  
When a surveyor approaches an American citizen with a question: ―What do you think 
about our welfare policy?‖ she would probably not know what to say. In countries like the US, 
most policies are consistent across administrations, even when a Democrat replaces a Republican 
and vice versa. Unless they become salient campaign issues, policies are rarely debated in the 
news. It is challenging to evaluate the impact of most policies on individual’s well-being. 
Instead, they remain ―out of reach, out of sight, out of mind‖ (Lippmann, 1925). Taking these 
factors into account, it is not surprising that most people have difficulties forming an opinion on 
most issues (Zaller, 1992, McCann and Lawson, 2003). Their preferences are estimated by polls 
with a large measurement error (Ansolabehere et al., 2008).  
In developing countries, the policy-making field is more dynamic. Argentina is known 
for its radical switches in key policies from time to time. The country goes back and forth 
between liberalization and protectionism, between integration and isolation, between free market 
and state intervention (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). I take advantage of the recent switch, when a 
center-right politician, Mauricio Macri, was elected a president in 2015 and replaced a left-wing 
populist, Cristina Kirchner. This situation allows me to ask people about their attitudes towards 
one set of policies, which is very different from another set of policies that was in place before 
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2015. They had an opportunity to compare the outcomes of both. Rephrasing Lippmann (1925), I 
could ask something about which they could reach, see, and make up their mind.  
Argentina was governed by a peronist, Nestor Kirchner, in 2003-2007 and, then, by his 
wife, Cristina Kirchner, in 2007-2015. Both Kirchners pursued populist policies. The federal 
government heavily subsidized utilities (gas, water, electricity) and public transportation. 
Various enterprises were re-nationalized, including YPF, the largest oil company, Aerolineas 
Argentinas, and the national postal service. To protect domestic industries, imports were 
restricted. Neither companies nor individuals could buy foreign currency without special 
permission. The government restructured most of the debt but refused to pay the holdout 
creditors (those who remained after debt restructuring). The economy did well while 
international commodity prices remained high. Over time, however, subsidies and distortions 
increased. Economic growth slowed down in 2012—2014 (1.4% per year). By 2014, the Central 
Bank reserves had declined to less than $30 billion from $50 billion two years earlier. The 
budget deficit reached 4.8% of GDP in 2015. Inflation was 30-40% per annum. Argentina had 
stayed out of international financial markets for 15 years. 
In November 2015, a center-right politician, Mauricio Macri, won the presidential 
election with just a 2.7% margin in the second round against the Kirchnerist candidate Daniel 
Scioli. Macri received 3% fewer votes in the first round. He reversed many policies implemented 
by the Kirchners. During his presidency subsidies for utilities and transport were gradually 
removed. As a result, electricity became 20 times more expensive, gas 10 times, water 9 times, 
and public transport 6 times.
4
 He removed capital controls and lowered trade barriers. 
                                                          
4
 According to the Department of Statistics of the city of Buenos Aires 
(https://www.estadisticaciudad.gob.ar/eyc/?p=28446).  
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Specifically, export duties on wheat, beef, and corn were eliminated, and export tariffs on 
soybeans were reduced from 35% to 30%. Also, the Kirchner government had restricted the 
export of a number of agricultural products, such as beef and crops. The Macri government 
removed these restrictions. Previously, all imports were subject to authorizations issued on 
discretionary criteria. Import regulations became more transparent. Finally, the Macri 
government reached agreements with the ―holdout‖ creditors, which led to the end of 
Argentina’s 2001  default on sovereign debt.5 
During Macri’s presidency the economic performance was variable and most of the time 
disappointing. In 2016, GDP shrank by 3.7% and consumer prices grew by 41%. The next year 
was more economically successful. According to the World Bank, in 2017 Argentina 
experienced economic growth 2.7%. The inflation was recorded at 24.8% - the lowest rate in 
years. Also, wages grew by a higher rate than did inflation, resulting in a real income rise. 
Unemployment was 8.4%, and the poverty rate fell to 25.7%. The real peso appreciation reached 
24% during 2016-2017. These favorable results let the incumbent party Let’s Change win the 
mid-term elections in October 2017. The economic conditions changed in the first half of 2018. 
Argentina experienced the largest drought in 50 years, which resulted in lower exports and 
higher food inflation. In addition, prices for soybeans, a major export, were at the lowest levels 
in a decade. Finally, the economic growth of 2017 was fuelled, to a great extent, by foreign 
investment. The amount of international capital decreased after rising US interest rates. As a 
result, the peso depreciated against the dollar by more than 100%. The government had to ask the 
IMF to provide it with a $57.1 billion loan to stabilize the economy. In 2018 the economy 
contracted by 2.5%, in 2019 by 2.2%. Inflation reached almost 48% in 2018 and hit 53.8% in 
                                                          
5
 http://argentinareforms.csis.org/ 
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2019, the highest rate since 1991. At the same time, wages increased by 29% and 35% in these 
two years, so that real income declined. In 2019, the unemployment rate rose to more than 10% 
and the poverty rate to more than 35%. After more than a year-long recession, Macri’s attempt to 
be reelected failed. In October 2019, the Kirchner candidate Alberto Fernandez won the 
presidential election in the first round with 48.24% (Macri received 40.28%). Cristina Kirchner 
had a constitutional right to run for presidency herself, but she preferred to choose a successor 
and become vice-president.
6
  
 
1.4 Preview of the findings 
 
The analysis presented in this dissertation is based on the original surveys conducted in 
Argentina in the months of January and February in 2017, 2018, and 2019. 2,892, 3,840 and 
3,725 individuals participated in them, respectively.  
At the end of each survey, I asked respondents to complete the Global Financial Literacy 
test developed by Standard & Poor’s and used to evaluate financial literacy across the world in 
2014.
7
 I also asked questions about their attitudes towards recently implemented economic 
policies – elimination of trade barriers, elimination of subsidies for public transport and utilities, 
and the country’s integration into the world financial markets. I find a strong correlation between 
financial knowledge and support for pro-market economic policies. Like in all observational 
studies, when one aims to measure the effect of knowledge, the biggest challenge is to 
                                                          
6
 A reaction of the financial markets can be an indication of how substantial and unexpected the change in economic 
policies was. Over a month, right before the first and after the second round of the presidential election 2015 the 
Merval index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange increased by 25%. During several days after the primaries in 
August 2019, when it became clear that Macri was hardly going to be reelected, this index was cut almost in half. 
7
  https://gflec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Finlit_paper_16_F2_singles.pdf 
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disentangle the effect of knowledge from the effects of other factors correlated with it. Previous 
research shows that drivers for policy preferences can be grouped into two broad categories – 
partisan attachments and self-interest. Therefore, the first challenge in measuring the effect of 
knowledge would be to separate the effect of knowledge from the effect of party identification. I 
show that, unlike other conventional measures of knowledge, my knowledge measure is 
uncorrelated with partisanship. The incumbent partisans do not do particularly better (or worse) 
on the test. However, financially literate individuals tend to be better-educated wealthier males. 
Previous studies demonstrate that individuals with these traits are in a better position to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the free market (Brainerd, 1998, Ravallion, 2001, 
Panizza and Yañez, 2005). Therefore, they can support market-oriented polices because they 
gain from them, not because they know how the economy functions. I address this issue by 
conducting the analysis in two different contexts – economic boom and recession. The 2018 
survey was preceded by an economically successful year, particularly favorable for middle and 
upper classes. I find that each correctly answered question on the test adds 3.9 percentage points 
to the approval of an open economy and the elimination of subsidies and 3.7 percentage points 
the debt payment in the 2018 estimates, given the overall level of support ranges from 29.7% to 
38.3%. The 2019 survey was carried out in the middle of the economic crisis that reversed the 
fortunes of middle class. However, I continue to observe the relationship between financial 
knowledge and economic policy approval. More financially literate people (measured by each 
point scored) were more supportive of the opening of the economy by 2.5 percentage points, the 
elimination of subsidies by 3.4 percentage points, and the debt payment by 4.1 percentage points 
in 2019, while the average approval rate varies from 27.3% to 34%. This result suggests that it is 
knowledge itself that drives support for economic policies.  
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To ensure that my results are not artifacts of a particular knowledge test, I supplement the 
2019 survey with an economic knowledge test. I adapted four questions from a longer Economic 
Literacy Quiz developed by the Council for Economic Education.
8
 This knowledge measure is 
also uncorrelated with partisanship. The effect of economic education appears to be lower in 
magnitude but nonetheless is statistically and economically significant. Each correctly answered 
question on the quiz adds 1.8 percentage points to the support for the open economy, 1.6 
percentage points to the elimination of subsidies, and 4.2 percentage points to the debt payment. 
To establish the causal link between knowledge and preferences for pro-market economic 
policies, I embedded two survey experiments in the 2018 and 2019 surveys. Randomly selected 
respondents were provided with either ―an economic lesson‖ treatment or ―a case study‖ of 
Venezuela treatment regarding the consequences of certain economic policies. The goal of the 
treatments was to educate respondents about the consequences of anti-market economic policies 
on the economy and individual well-being. In the 2018 survey, respondents in the treatment 
condition were, indeed, more likely to support the elimination of trade restrictions and the 
repayment of the debt. Respondents who received ―an economic lesson‖ had a higher probability 
of approving the open economy by 8.3 points and the debt payment by 9.6 points. Those who 
read about Venezuela’s experience had a higher probability of favoring the open economy by 
10.2 points and the debt payment by 8.8 points. In the survey carried out a year later, I do not 
reach the same level of significance, even though there were 45% more observations in both 
treatment and control groups. In the 2019 sample, the coefficients for the treatment dummies are 
relatively large in magnitude, and their signs are consistent with the hypothesis, though they are 
marginally significant at the 14-19% level.  
                                                          
8
 https://www.councilforeconed.org/quiz/economic-literacy-quiz/ 
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In addition, I analyze other outcomes for which financial knowledge might matter, 
beyond policy preferences. Specifically, I test three hypotheses – whether financially educated 
individuals have more expertise about current economic events, whether they report their income 
truthfully, and whether they distinguish long-term challenges that the country faces from short-
term economic fluctuations. These outcomes are relevant for the quality of democracy. I use the 
data from the second wave of the 2017 survey (participants of the survey of January-February 
2017 were contacted 5 months later) to demonstrate that financially educated respondents have a 
higher probability of answering a typical question correctly on a policy-specific knowledge test – 
about the dynamics of consumer prices. I reach this result controlling for partisanship, the 
strongest predictor of answers to questions of this sort. The question was as follows: ―Would you 
say that during January-June 2017 the inflation was higher, lower, or the same as in January-June 
2016?‖ The right answer is that inflation in January-June 2017 was more than twice as low than 
was the inflation in January-June 2016. This sharp decline was discussed by the media. I find 
that each correctly answered question on the financial literacy test increases the probability of the 
right response to the question about inflation by 2.3 percentage points.  
I find also that financially knowledgeable people do not seem to hide their income. I 
calculate unreported income by comparing self-reported income and expenditures. The greater 
the discrepancy between predicted income, based on expenditures, and self-reported income, the 
higher the probability that one underreports her income. I find a positive correlation between 
income reporting and financial knowledge. This result holds, even when controlling for all types 
of employment.  
Finally, I show that financially educated people distinguish long-term obstacles for 
economic development (e.g. corruption, education quality) from economic indicators that are 
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subject to short-term fluctuations and, possibly, consequences of long-term problems (e.g. 
inflation, unemployment). I find that individuals with higher level of financial knowledge more 
often name corruption as the main problem of the country in the 2018 survey. This result does 
not hold in 2019, likely due to the economic crisis that shifted the focus from corruption to the 
current economic indicators even among the financially literate. At the same time, the coefficient 
of financial knowledge is significant in both 2018 and 2019 in regressions with education as the 
dependent variable. This evidence suggests that financially educated people think more deeply 
about issues of the day and the long-run perspective. 
 
1.5 Plan of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the observational evidence of the 
importance of economic knowledge for economic policy preferences. I analyze whether more 
financially educated people are more likely to support pro-market economic policies. I find that 
financial knowledge measured by the score on the Financial Literacy test is associated with a 
higher support for these economic policies. I demonstrate that this measure of individual 
competence is not correlated with partisan attachments. I address the possible confoundedness 
between financial knowledge and a winning status by conducting my analyses in two different 
economic contexts – economic boom and recession. I receive consistent results both in 2018 and 
2019. In 2019, I supplement my analysis with another measure of knowledge – economic literacy 
quiz. The test results are also uncorrelated with party identification. Those who score higher on 
this test are more likely to support three policies in question.  
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In chapter 3, I present the experimental evidence. Two survey experiments were 
embedded in the survey in 2018 and 2019. Randomly selected respondents were given either ―an 
economic lesson‖ or ―a case study‖ of Venezuela treatments (or remained in the control group). I 
show that respondents in the treatment condition are more likely to support pro-market economic 
policies in 2018. The results are weaker in 2019, although the coefficients of the treatments 
dummies are economically large and their signs are consistent with the hypothesis. I explain the 
variability in results by the economic shock that happened in the interval between two surveys.  
In Chapter 4, I look at other outcomes that are relevant for the quality of democracy for 
which financial knowledge might matter, beyond policy preferences. I show that financial 
knowledge is positively correlated with another measure of individual competence – knowledge 
of policy-specific facts. Also, financially knowledgeable people do not seem to hide their 
income. Finally, my findings suggest that people with higher financial knowledge are more 
likely to consider corruption as the main problem of the country. I interpret this as their ability to 
distinguish between long-term drivers for economic development and short-term fluctuations that 
may be consequences of these long-term problems. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The effect of financial literacy on policy preferences:  
Observational evidence 
 
Having a knowledgeable citizenry that uses relevant knowledge to inform public choices is 
normatively desirable in a democracy. However, there is abundant evidence that reality falls 
short of this ideal. Political scientists disagree about the answer to the fundamental question 
about democracy - do knowledgeable individuals make choices different from those who remain 
ignorant? Some scholars argue that voters do not have resources and capabilities to carefully 
study the content of political debates (Lupia, 1994). They have to rely on informational shortcuts 
and thus emulate the behavior of well-informed voters. Other studies show that, equipped with 
relevant knowledge, voters arrive at political judgments different from those they would have 
reached if they had remained ignorant (Gerber and Green, 1999, Jerit and Zhao, 2020, Hill, 2017, 
Bullock, 2009, 2011).  
It is challenging to evaluate the effect of knowledge on political preferences because it is 
often correlated with other important drivers of political opinions, such as group attachments. 
Specifically, political scientists focus on two measures of knowledge – political awareness and 
knowledge of policy-specific facts. However, both types of knowledge result from group 
loyalties (Zaller, 1992, Bartels, 2002). In particular, political awareness—defined as knowledge 
of factual information related to politics (such as who was elected governor of a given state or 
how many chambers there are in the parliament)—indicates an individual’s level of exposure to 
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political communication and the strength of that individual’s identification with a party (Zaller, 
1992, Baker et al., 2006). Due to group attachments, the tendency is to learn policy-specific facts 
consistent with their partisan loyalties. When one’s party is in office, inflation seems to be under 
control. If a political opponent is in office, inflation is perceived to be on the rise, no matter what 
the truth is (Bartels, 2002, Bullock and Lenz, 2019).  
In this chapter, I investigate the role of fundamental knowledge in policy preferences. I 
focus on knowledge relevant to a policy domain but nonetheless independent of political 
attachments. More specifically, I am interested in measuring economic knowledge that may 
affect economic policy preferences. To do so, I measure economic knowledge with the Global 
Financial Literacy test developed by Standard & Poor’s and used to evaluate financial literacy in 
140 countries. I include this test in original surveys I conducted in Argentina. In this chapter, I 
present evidence from the 2018 and 2019 surveys of 3,840 and 3,725 individuals. I find that 
financially literate people are more likely to support pro-market economic policies. Each 
correctly answered question on the four-question test increases the probability of support for the 
elimination of the trade barriers by 2.4-3.9 percentage points, the elimination of subsidies for 
utilities and public transportation by 3.3-3.9%, and the repayment of international debt by 3.5-
4.1%, given the overall level of support for policies ranges from 27% to 38%. The effect of 
financial education is robust with respect to the inclusion of controls for party identification. The 
results are also robust with respect to the inclusion of controls for economic conditions. The 
economic situation in Argentina changed dramatically in the interval between the two surveys. 
These changes altered the distribution of economic winners and losers among voters. Those who 
relatively won before 2018 relatively lost in 2019. This allows me to examine the possibility that 
financially educated people were policy winners and their support for policies was due to 
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unobservable factors related to their winning status. The coefficients for financial education 
remain economically and statistically significant both during good and bad economic times. 
These results suggest that it is financial knowledge itself that increases support for pro-market 
economic policies. In addition, I perform propensity score matching regressions in which I 
compare individuals similar by key demographic characteristics (income, education, gender, age, 
party ID), but some are financially knowledgeable and others are not. The main result holds. 
Individuals with higher financial knowledge are more supportive for market-oriented policies 
than are their less knowledgeable peers.  
One may argue that the content of the financial literacy test is more suitable to evaluate 
math skills rather than economic knowledge. To check the robustness check of the main result, I 
added an economic literacy quiz to the 2019 survey. I adapted four questions from a longer 20-
question Economic Literacy Quiz developed by the Council for Economic Education to test 
American K-12 students. I show that economic literacy is not correlated with political 
attachments and has a positive effect on preferences for pro-market policies. Each correctly 
answered question in the economic literacy quiz increases the probability of approval for the 
opening of the economy by 1.8 percentage points, the elimination of subsidies by 1.6-1.7 
percentage points, and the debt payment by 4.2-4.3 percentage points. 
 
2.1 Theory and hypothesis 
 
Why would people who have learned more about economics be more likely to support market-
oriented economic policies? First, economic literacy may help people understand the 
consequences of policies that cannot be observed in the short-run or, perhaps, at all. For 
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example, some economic policies have a J-curve effect, when economic performance worsens at 
the beginning and recovers later. To illustrate, the elimination of export tariffs immediately leads 
to a larger fiscal deficit, but it stimulates export-oriented domestic production and, with some 
lag, exports. Thus, economic knowledge can be useful because individuals who posses this 
knowledge envision the entire picture, while those who lack it see only the downward trend. 
Knowledge makes them patient and confident.
9
 Second, knowledgeable individuals are less 
uncertain about how they will be affected by a new policy. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show 
that in cases when the majority of the population wins from a policy implementation but 
individuals are not sure whether they are winners or losers, they prefer the status quo. When a 
policy is efficiency-enhancing, the support for it among people with economic knowledge is 
higher. Third, knowledgeable individuals can distinguish the effect of policies from the effect of 
other factors on economic performance. Voters are known for their blind retrospection when they 
punish incumbents for bad economic times and reward them for good economic times, even 
though these conditions may be exogenous to the incumbent’s policy-making (Huber, Hill, and 
Lenz, 2012, Campello and Zucco, 2016). Specifically, the Argentine government tried to 
communicate that the economic crisis of 2018 was mostly a result of unfavorable external 
conditions beyond government control rather than a result of the implemented economic policies. 
In particular, the worst drought in 50 years led to a reduction of the annual GDP growth between 
0.5% and 1% because of lower exports and higher food inflation.
10
 In addition, prices for 
soybeans, a major export, were at the lowest levels in a decade. Finally, the economic growth of 
                                                          
9
 Falk et al. (2018) show that patience is positively correlated with income, a number of variables capturing a spirit 
of capitalism, a number of biogeographic variables that previously were related to economic development, 
educational attainment, cognitive skills, and math skills 
10 https://www.infobae.com/economia/2018/02/28/los-7-efectos-que-generara-en-la-economia-la-peor-sequia-de-los-
ultimos-44-anos-en-la-argentina/ (in Spanish) 
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2017 was fuelled, to a great extent, by foreign investment. The amount of international capital 
decreased after the increase in US interest rates.  
The ability to foresee the long-term effect of a policy, more certainty about one’s 
financial well-being in the aftermath of policy implementation, and the ability to distinguish 
between the effect of policies and the effect of other factors on economic outcomes are possible 
mechanisms behind the effect of knowledge per se. Other mechanisms behind opinion formation 
driven by knowledge may exist.  
However, there may be alternative explanations for the relationship between financial 
education and the support for pro-market policies. First, it is possible that financially literate 
people benefit as a result of these policies. This status may be manifested in several features. For 
example, they may benefit because they are wealthy. People with higher income may hope to 
gain more in a free market.11 Market-oriented policies usually mean lower taxes and less 
regulation. Richer people directly benefit from lower taxes. Also, richer people are usually more 
entrepreneurial, hence benefit more from deregulation. They also have resources to survive the 
adjustment. Previous research finds evidence of the correlation between pro-market policy 
preferences and income (Baker, 2009, Graham and Pettinato, 2004, Stokes, 2001a). The 
relationship between social class and support for the market economy was documented in 
transitional economies (Fidrmuc 2000a, 2000b). Even in the United States, wealth is associated 
with the Republican party, known for its pro-market positions (Green et al., 2002). Additionally, 
pro-market voters may be employed in a winning industry.  
                                                          
11
 There is an ongoing debate among economists as to whether the poor gain from economic growth. Dollar and 
Kraay (2002) argue that growth is good for the poor because it increases average income without producing major 
income distribution shifts. In contrast, Ravallion (2001) points to a large variation in outcomes among countries. In 
many cases, growth raises inequality because the upper classes are in a better position to take advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by the expanding economy. In other words, the poor do not lose, but they also do not gain as 
much as those to the right in the income distribution. 
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Second, financially literate individuals may happen to be partisans of a certain political 
camp. As Achen and Bartels (2016) state, ―people tend to adopt beliefs, attitudes, and values that 
reinforce and rationalize their partisan loyalties.‖ That means some people like the incumbent 
and her party and, then, support policies they implement. They approve pro-market policies not 
because of their knowledge but because they liked the incumbent in the first place.  
In this chapter, I test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Economically educated individuals support pro-market economic policies because 
of their economic knowledge per se.  
 
2.2 Empirical strategy 
2.2.1 Dependent variables 
 
I am interested in the effect of the economic knowledge on economic policy preferences. The 
three dependent variables measure attitudes towards specific economic policies: the opening of 
the economy, the elimination of subsidies, and the historic debt payment. The questions are as 
follows: 
  ―Do you approve or not the elimination of export and import restrictions (the 
abolishment of export quotas, end of capital control, introduction of zero export tariffs for 
meat, grains, etc.)?‖ 
 ―Do you approve or not the reduction of public service subsidies in Argentina (subsidies 
of electricity, gas, water, public transportation)?‖ 
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 ―Do you approve or not the Argentina’s payment of the historic debt to holdout 
bondholders?‖ 
These policies would be familiar to Argentine citizens because the Macri government 
implemented them in 2016-2019. To integrate the previously isolated economy into the world 
market, the new government removed the capital controls. Export tariffs on wheat, beef, and corn 
were eliminated, and tariffs on soybeans were reduced from 35% to 28.5%. Import restrictions 
were relaxed.  
The new administration began cutting the subsidies for utilities in its first months in 
office. Between December 2015 and March 2019, electricity became 20 times more expensive, 
gas 8.5 times, and water 7 times in the city of Buenos Aires. Public transportation became 6 
times more expensive. Although the most vulnerable categories of consumers could apply for 
discounts, the elimination of subsidies increased the share of utilities in the consumption basket 
from 4.2% to 10%, according to the estimates of the consultancy OJF.
12
 At the same time, the 
generous subsidies that previously had been given to everyone, including middle and upper class 
families and companies, were one of the reasons for the budget deficit and overconsumption.  
Finally, in 2016 Argentina paid off its debt on the holdout creditors’ terms. The dispute 
concerned whether these holdout bondholders should be fully compensated for their unlucky 
investment, even though they refused to accept Argentina’s offer during the debt restructuring. 
The new government opted for payment in order to obtain access to international financial 
markets. 
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 https://www.infobae.com/economia/2019/02/24/golpe-al-consumo-el-gasto-en-servicios-publicos-en-los-hogares-
duplica-el-nivel-de-2015/ 
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2.2.2 Explanatory variables. Knowledge tests 
 
Evaluating the effect of economic knowledge requires a measure of economic knowledge that is 
independent from political inclinations or other group-based attachments. I use a Global 
Financial Literacy test developed by Standard & Poor’s that has been used to evaluate financial 
literacy across the world in 2014.
13
 It consists of four questions which measure fundamental 
concepts for financial day-to-day decision-making: risk diversification, inflation, basic numeracy 
(interest), and interest compounding. This list of questions, offered to respondents at the very end 
of the surveys, is as follows: 
Q1: Suppose you need to borrow 100 U.S. dollars. Which is the lower amount to pay back: 105 
U.S. dollars or 100 U.S. dollars plus three percent?  
Q2: Suppose over the next 10 years the prices of the things you buy double. If your income also 
doubles, will you be able to buy less than you can buy today, the same as you can buy today, or 
more than you can buy today? 
Q3: Suppose you have some money. Is it safer to put your money into one business or 
investment, or to put your money into multiple businesses or investments?  
Q4: Suppose you put money in the bank for two years and the bank agrees to add 15 percent per 
year to your account. Will the bank add more money to your account the second year than it did 
the first year, or will it add the same amount of money both years? 
One may say that these questions test mathematical ability rather than economic 
knowledge. To make sure my results are not artifacts of a particular knowledge test, I use an 
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 https://gflec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Finlit_paper_16_F2_singles.pdf 
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alternative four-question measure as well. To the best of my knowledge, there is no short and 
universally understandable test that specifically evaluates economic knowledge. I adapt four 
questions from a 20-questions quiz of economic literacy developed by the Council for Economic 
Education, an NGO whose mission is to teach American K-12 students about economics.
14
 The 
list of the questions included in the survey is as follows: 
Q5: Imagine that Argentina stopped importing automobiles from Brazil, who would be most 
likely to benefit? 
o Automobile manufactures in Brazil 
o Consumers in Argentina 
o Automobile manufactures in Argentina 
o Do not know 
Q6: Imagine that severe drought occurred in Argentina this summer. How would vegetable 
prices be affected? 
o Prices will increase  
o Prices will decrease 
o Prices will remain the same 
o Do not know 
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 https://www.councilforeconed.org/news-information/economic-literacy-quiz/  
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Q7: Imagine that banks increase interest rates from 40% to 50%. This would most likely 
encourage… 
o Business to invest 
o People to purchase housing 
o People to save money 
o Do not know 
Q8: Imagine that the price of beef doubled and the price of poultry stayed the same. People 
would most likely buy… 
o More poultry and less beef 
o More beef and less poultry 
o The same amount of poultry and beef 
o Do not know 
2.2.3 Other explanatory variables 
The effects of information per se need to be disentangled from the effects of economic interests 
and partisan support. Citizens who benefited or expected to benefit from the policies would be 
more likely to support them, and citizens who supported Macri would have been more likely to 
favor his policies.  
To account for the possibility that financially educated people are policy winners because 
of their wealth, I control for income. High tax evasion and the large informal economy are 
reasons why self-reported income may not be very informative in a Latin American context 
(Torgler, 2003). I add a number of variables to account for unreported income. Specifically, I 
include an individual’s assets (home, car, computer, and access to hot water and the sewage 
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system) and consumption features (food security, private school for kids, commercial medical 
insurance, and recent travels). To account for the possibility that financially educated people are 
policy winners because they are employed in a winning industry, I include industry fixed effects. 
I use the national statistics agency (INDEC) classification of industries. During 2018, the growth 
within sectors varied greatly. For example, the automotive industry grew by 2.8%, while 
agriculture dropped by 15.1%. It is reasonable to assume that many financially literate people 
work in the financial sector, which grew by 4% despite the economic crisis.  
To the question, ―Is there any political party you feel closer to than others?‖, I code Macri 
partisans as those who choose the incumbent’s party Let’s Change and Kirchner partisans as 
those who choose the Front for Victory, one of the wings of the Peronist party founded by 
Cristina Kirchner. 
I include the description of variables used in the analysis in Appendix 2.6.2. 
2.2.4 The change in the economic situation 
 
There could be unobservable variables correlated with both financial education and variables 
related to a winning status that confound the relationship between policy preferences and 
knowledge. People might support pro-market policies because they benefit from those policies 
rather than because they are well-informed. The economic situation changed significantly in the 
interval between the surveys, altering the economic situation of the middle class, the core support 
group of pro-market policies. In 2016-2017, middle and upper classes benefited more 
economically than did the poor because inflation was higher for products and services that 
represent a larger part of the budgets of the poor. In particular, public transport and utilities, 
major expenses for poor families, became up to 20 times more expensive. At the same time, 
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inflation for products and services whose price depends on the exchange rate of the peso, such as 
imported goods and travels abroad, was lower than general inflation. These items usually 
represent a relatively larger share of the budgets of upper and middle class families. In 2016-
2017, a real appreciation of the dollar against the peso was 24%. For example, smartphones 
became more expensive only by 41% and tourist packages by 24%, while prices in general grew 
by 78% in the city of Buenos Aires over these two years.
15
 The fortunes of the middle class 
moved in the opposite direction after April 2018. Devaluation of the peso by more than 100% 
made relatively more affluent Argentines reconsider their consumption and diminish the 
proportion of imported products and services, while prices of goods in the consumption basket of 
the poor increased at a rate no higher than that of general inflation. To summarize, relative 
economic winners in 2016-2017 became relative economic losers in 2018. This allows me to test 
the hypothesis regarding the effect of economic knowledge in two substantially different 
economic contexts. If these unobservable factors correlated with a winning status and financial 
education cause the effect in 2018, then the correlation between financial education and 
economic policies approval would drop to 0 or become even negative in 2019. But if economic 
knowledge causes the effect, then the relationship would remain significant.  
2.2.5 Propensity score matching 
 
In addition to OLS regressions, I perform propensity score matching regressions for both 2018 
and 2019 samples. I match highly financially educated individuals (those who score at least 2 in 
the test) with low educated individuals (those who score 0) by income, education, gender, and 
age. I exclude observations with score ―1‖ from both samples. In a separate propensity score 
model I add ―Macri partisan‖ to the list of matching variables. I analyze whether individuals with 
                                                          
15 http://www.estadisticaciudad.gob.ar/eyc/?p=89191 
31 
 
higher financial knowledge look differently upon pro-market policies when compared to 
individuals with similar key demographic characteristics but with low financial knowledge. 
 
2.3 Data 
 
Of the 3,840 and 3,725 individuals who participated in the two surveys, the average score in the 
financial literacy test is 1.22-1.29 (in Appendix 2.6.1 in this chapter I describe the sampling 
procedure, and in Appendix 2.6.3 I present the summary statistics of the variables used in the 
analysis). In my 2019 sample, 12.9% of respondents answered three questions correctly, 22.9% 
two questions, 30.4% one question, and 30.3% got all questions wrong.
16
 Only 3.5% of 
respondents achieved the highest score on the test.
17
 
On average, participants demonstrate better results on the economic literacy test, possibly 
because the questions are closer to real world experience and can be answered based on 
experience. Only 9.4% of respondents could not answer any single question.  The distribution of 
the correct answers was the following: 16.3% answered one question correctly, 30.5% two 
questions, 29.5% three questions, 14.4% all four questions. People who do well on the financial 
literacy test generally receive a high score on the economic literacy test. The correlation between 
the test results is 0.41 (significant at the 1% level). One might expect that the correlation between 
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 The distribution of the results in 2018 is very similar to that in 2019 (0 correct answers – 34.7%, 1 - 28.6%, 2 - 
20.7%, 3 – 12.1%, 4 – 4%). 
17
 The test scores I get are considerably lower than those received from Argentina by Standard & Poor’s in 2014 (in 
their test 28% of participants answered at least three questions correctly, slightly below the world average (33.3%)). 
I used the same wording of the questions for Spanish-speaking countries. However, I added the option ―Do not 
know‖ to all answers, which was absent in the original survey. Otherwise, the test results would suffer from a large 
measurement error because the probability of choosing the right answer among 2-3 options purely by chance is so 
high. Additionally, the results could be different because the test was embedded in a longer questionnaire. There was 
no disclaimer before the test that a respondent was being evaluated for financial literacy. When people know they 
are taking an exam, they put more effort into their answers. 
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the test results that measure similar types of knowledge would be higher. The relatively low 
number reflects differences in the distribution of answers described above. Respondents find the 
economic literacy quiz easier. It seems that one can get it right based on common sense, while 
the financial literacy test requires some academic preparation and more specific experience.  
The overall government approval dropped considerably from 2018 to 2019. If in the first 
year 28.8% said that they generally ―approve of the government’s course of action,‖ while in 
2019 only 15.6% thought so. Notably, the answers to questions about specific policies are a lot 
more stable on average. The approval rate of the opening of the economy decreased from 29.7% 
to 27.3%, the elimination of subsidies from 34.7% to 33%, the debt payment from 38.3% to 
34%. However, the decline in support among wealthier individuals was considerably higher than 
among poorer individuals. Table 2.1 summarizes the change in support for policies by income 
group. 
 Also, fewer people identify themselves with the Macri’s party Let’s Change, a finding 
consistent with the drop in government support. In the 2018 sample, 14.3% of respondents ―feel 
closer‖ to the incumbent’s party, while in 2019 only 8.8% think so.18 On the contrary, the 
percentage of those who ―feel closer‖ to the party of the main competitor, Cristina Kirchner, the 
Front for Victory, grew slightly – from 16.6% to 17.2%.19 In both years, half of the sample 
claims that they are not partisans of any political party. 
 
                                                          
18
 Another 4.3% identify themselves with Radicalists, who are close to the incumbent party ideologically but 
presented separate candidates in the latest elections. 
19
 There are another 6.8% who identify themselves with the Peronist party in the 2019 sample. Kirchnerism can be 
considered as a movement within a broader Peronist movement. I included separate options for Kirchnerists and 
Peronists for the party identification question because these movements had separate candidates in the latest 
elections. 
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Table12.1 The difference in support for pro-market policies by year by income group 
The table presents the approval rates for the three economic policies (open economy, elimination of subsidies, debt 
payment) by year by income group. The values are given in percentages. Monthly income in the table is calculated 
based on the exchange rate in January 2019. Income categories were different in 2018 because of the different 
exchange rate between the dollar and the peso: <$460, $460-$900, $900-$1,580, $1,580-$2,370, >$2,370. 
Monthly 
income* 
Open economy 
Elimination of 
subsidies 
Debt payment 
2018 2019 Diff. 2018 2019 Diff. 2018 2019 Diff. 
< $280 21.8 22 0.3 27.8 27.1 -0.7 31.1 28.5 -2.7 
$280-$580 29.2 29.9 0.6 32.2 35.2 3 40 35.4 -4.6 
$580-$1,000 39.1 29.3 -9.8 44.4 36.3 -8.1 45.7 38.9 -6.8 
$1,000-$1,500 44.6 33.8 -10.8 52.7 42.4 -10.3 50 41.1 -8.9 
>$1,500 55.9 46.6 -9.3 55.9 50.5 -5.4 52.9 49.5 -3.4 
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2.4 Results 
 
In Table 2.2 I provide evidence of the lack of correlation between party identification and 
financial knowledge. The coefficients for partisanship are not statistically significant, both in 
2018 and 2019. This result suggests that there are no unobservable characteristics of Macri 
partisans, other than those already included in the model, that add to financial literacy and,  
therefore, to the support for policies.
20
  
However, financial knowledge is correlated with other factors that, as I show later, play a 
role in support for pro-market policies. For example, the level of financial literacy rises with 
income. Compared to individuals whose income is below the minimum wage, the wealthiest 
respondents score higher by 0.21-0.36 points. The effect of education rises monotonically. Each 
educational degree obtained adds, on average, 0.14 points to the test score. Men score 0.15-0.19 
points higher on the test. Unreported income is also important. The coefficients for dummies for 
owning a home, car, or computer, and having access to hot water and the sewage system 
(―assets‖ variables) are statistically significant at the 1-5% level. In addition, individuals who 
pay for commercial medical insurance, send their kids to private schools, or travelled abroad 
over the previous two years (―consumption‖ variables) are more financially literate.  
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 The proportion of financially educated people is not very high in the sample as well as the proportion of Macri 
partisans. There is a possibility that there are not enough observations to capture the correlation between these two 
variables. 
35 
 
Table22.2 Determinants of financial literacy: OLS regression 
The table presents the relation of financial literacy with individual traits, such as gender, age, education, income, 
assets in ownership, consumption features, and party identification. The variables are defined in Appendix 2.6.2. 
The full version of the table is reported in Appendix 2.6.4. Age dummies include dummies for the following age 
categories - 23-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-60 years, >60 years. Education dummies include dummies for the 
following educational degrees - Primary school, High school, College and Graduate school. Income dummies 
include dummies for the following income categories - $460-$900, $900-$1,580, $1,580-$2,370, >$2,370 in 2018 
and $280-$580, $580-$1,000, $1,000-$1,500, >$1,500 in 2019. Asset dummies include dummies for Home, Car, 
Computer, Hot water, and Sewage system. Consumption dummies include dummies for Commercial insurance, 
Social or Employer-sponsored insurance, Private school, Public School and categorical variables for Nutrition and 
Travel. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
Dependent variable:  Financial knowledge 
 
2018 2018 2019 2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 0.186 0.188 0.149 0.149 
 
(0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.061 
 
0.042 
  
(0.05) 
 
(0.062) 
Age dummies Y Y Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
R
2
 0.197 0.197 0.151 0.151 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3725 3725 
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Table 2.3 presents the analysis of the determinants of attitudes toward specific policies: 
the opening of the economy, the elimination of subsidies, and the debt payment. I use an OLS 
regression to estimate the marginal effects of individual traits on support for the economic 
policies (defined as binary variables). I report the results of the logit regressions in Appendix 
2.6.6. I find no major discrepancies between the estimates of the two estimation procedures. 
In the 2018 estimates (column (1)), each correctly answered question in the test adds to 
the approval of the open economy and the elimination of subsidies by 3.9 percentage points and 
to the debt payment by 3.7 percentage points. In 2019 (column (3)), more financially literate 
people (measured by each point scored) are more supportive of the opening of the economy by 
2.5 percentage points, the elimination of subsidies by 3.4 percentage points, and the debt 
payment by 4.1 percentage points. The difference in the coefficients for Financial knowledge in 
the 2018 and the 2019 samples is not statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficients 
implies that the difference in the level of support for the open economy between respondents 
with the minimum and the maximum score on the test constitutes 15.6 percentage points in 2018 
and 10 percentage points in 2019, for the elimination of subsidies 15.6 percentage points and 
13.6 percentage points, respectively, and for the debt payment 14.8 percentage points and 16.4 
percentage points, respectively. If all respondents were fully financially educated, it would 
increase the average support for the elimination of the trade barriers from 29.7% to 40.5% in 
2018 and from 27.3% to 34% in 2019, for the elimination of subsidies from 34.7% to 45.5% in 
2018 and from 33% to 42.2% in 2019, for the debt payment from 38.3% to 48.6% in 2018 and 
from 34% to 45.1%in 2019.  
When I add a dummy for identification with the incumbent’s party, the coefficient for 
Financial knowledge drops slightly but remains statistically significant at the 1% level (columns 
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(2) and (4)). I also run the same regressions on the separate subsamples of Macri partisans 
(N=549 in 2018 and N=326 in 2019) and non-partisans (N=3,291 and N=3,399, respectively).
21
 
The coefficient of Financial knowledge continues to be statistically significant at the 1-5% for all 
policies.
22
  
Partisanship predictably increases support for the incumbents’ policies by approximately 
a third. In addition to party identification, I control for gender and find that males are more 
supportive of the open economy. I use dummies for categories of age, education, and income to 
account for possible non-linear effects of different categories. The approval rate for the Open 
economy and the Elimination of subsidies rises monotonically with age. Because self-reported 
income may not be very reliable in this particular context, I add batteries of variables that take 
into account assets in ownership and consumption features. These variables have greater 
explanatory power than income categories. Notably, educational categories are insignificant in 
the presence of Financial knowledge. This finding may be due to collinearity, but it does not 
mean that education is not important. Its effect may be captured by other variables, such as  
Financial knowledge, Income, assets, or spending. 
I repeat the analysis on the subsamples of the relatively affluent individuals (income 
greater than the minimum wage) and the poorest individuals in the sample (income lower than 
the minimum wage), respondents with higher education (college and more) and lower education 
(up to high school degree).
23
 The effect of Financial knowledge always remains significant.  
 
                                                          
21
 Not reported. 
22
 The only exception is the subsample of Macri partisans with Debt payment as a dependant variable in 2019, in 
which Financial knowledge becomes insignificant, likely due to an insufficient number of observations.  
23
 Not reported. 
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Table32.3 Determinants of the pro-market policies approval: OLS regression 
(Panel A) 
The table presents the relation of financial education and the attitude towards the elimination of the trade barriers 
(Panel A), the elimination of subsidies (Panel B), and the debt payment (Panel C). The variables are defined in 
Appendix 2.6.2. The full version of the table is reported in Appendix 2.6.5. Age dummies include dummies for the 
following age categories - 23-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-60 years, >60 years. Education dummies include dummies 
for the following educational degrees - Primary school, High school, College and Graduate school. Income 
dummies include dummies for the following income categories - $460-$900, $900-$1,580, $1,580-$2,370, >$2,370 
in 2018 and $280-$580, $580-$1,000, $1,000-$1,500, >$1,500 in 2019. Asset dummies include dummies for Home, 
Car, Computer, Hot water, and Sewage system. Consumption dummies include dummies for Commercial insurance, 
Social or Employer-sponsored insurance, Private school, Public School and categorical variables for Nutrition and 
Travel. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable:   Approve open economy 
 
2018 2018 2019 2019 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financial education 0.039 0.037 0.025 0.024 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male 0.020 0.033 0.043 0.047 
 
(0.015) (0.015)** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.310 
 
0.297 
  
(0.02)*** 
 
(0.025)*** 
Age dummies Y Y Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
R
2
 0.110 0.162 0.086 0.120 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3725 3725 
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Table 2.3 Determinants of the pro-market policies approval: OLS regression (Panel 
B and C) 
Panel B 
Dependent variable:  Approve elimination of subsidies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Finance education 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.033 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male -0.002 0.012 0.003 0.007 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Macri partisan 
 
0.331 
 
0.291 
  
(0.021)*** 
 
(0.026)*** 
Age dummies Y Y Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
R
2
 0.100 0.155 0.083 0.112 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3725 3725 
Panel C 
Dependent variable:  Approve debt payment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Finance education 0.037 0.035 0.041 0.040 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male 0.020 0.032 0.024 0.028 
 
(0.017) (0.016)* (0.016) (0.016)* 
Macri partisan 
 
0.301 
 
0.260 
  
(0.022)*** 
 
(0.027)*** 
Age dummies Y Y Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
R
2
 0.064 0.107 0.081 0.104 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3725 3725 
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In addition to OLS regressions, I conduct a propensity score matching. I match 
individuals in the 2018 and the 2019 samples by key demographic characteristics – income, age, 
education, and gender – and estimate the effect of the ―treatment‖ – financial knowledge. I drop 
observations in the middle of the distribution – those who answered one question correctly - and 
compare highly educated with low educated individuals. This yields 1,334 observations in the 
control group and 1,409 observations in the treatment group in 2018. In 2019, the sample is split 
into 1,464 treated and 1,127 untreated observations. I use 1:1 nearest-neighbor matching - each 
individual in the control group is compared with a similar individual in the treatment group by 
propensity score.  
Table 2.4 displays the estimates of the propensity score matching regressions. I observe 
statistically significant difference in support for market-oriented economic policies between 
individuals with higher and lower level of financial knowledge. More knowledgeable 
respondents tend to be more supportive for all three policies with t-statistics ranging from 2.17 
and 3.91. Specifically, their approval rate of the elimination of the trade barriers is greater by 
15.7 percentage points in 2018 and by 12.3 percentage points in 2019, of the subsidy cut by 14.7 
and 11.1 percentage points, and of the debt payment by 22.6 and 17.5 percentage points, 
respectively.  
In Appendix 2.6.7 I report another specification of the propensity score regression in 
which I add a dummy for Macri partisans to the list of matching variables. The support rate 
among highly financially educated respondents continues to be higher than among those with a 
minimum score on the test (with t-statistics ranging from 1.88 to 3.3). 
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Table42.4 The effect of financial knowledge on the pro-market policies 
approval: propensity score matching regression 
The table presents the relation between financial knowledge and the attitude towards the elimination of the trade 
barriers, the elimination of subsidies, and the debt payment for the 2018 and 2019 samples. The variables are 
defined in Appendix 2.6.2. Observations with score ―1‖ in the financial literacy test are dropped. The treated group 
includes respondents who scored at least 2 on the test (1,409 observations in 2018 and 1,464 in 2019). The control 
group includes respondents who score 0 on the test (1,334 observations in 2018 and 1,127 in 2019). The matched 
sample is constructed on the 1:1 basis. 
  2018 2019 
  Unmatched sample     Unmatched sample     
  Treated Controls Dif. t-stat Treated Controls Dif. t-stat 
Open economy 0.383 0.217 0.167 9.65 0.320 0.222 0.098 5.55 
Elimination of 
subsidies 
0.432 0.259 0.174 9.7 0.379 0.252 0.127 6.91 
Debt payment 0.471 0.289 0.181 9.93 0.417 0.243 0.174 9.42 
  Matched sample  Matched sample      
Open economy 0.383 0.226 0.157 2.92 0.320 0.197 0.123 2.45 
Elimination of 
subsidies 
0.432 0.285 0.147 2.6 0.379 0.268 0.111 2.17 
Debt payment 0.471 0.245 0.226 3.91 0.417 0.242 0.175 3.48 
  Matching variables Matching variables 
  Mean     Mean     
  Treated Control %Bias t-test Treated Control %Bias t-test 
Male  0.572 0.569 0.6 0.15 0.510 0.510 0 0 
Age 2.882 2.890 -0.6 -0.16 3.123 3.128 -0.4 -0.11 
Education  3.434 3.423 1.4 0.39 3.391 3.391 0 0 
Income 2.347 2.363 -1.4 -0.36 2.274 2.274 0 0 
Number of 
observations 
2,743 2,591 
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As a robustness check, I use the results of the economic literacy quiz instead of the 
financial literacy test (available only for 2019). Table 2.5 presents the determinants of economic 
literacy. Predictably, they are similar to that of financial education. The test scores in the 
economic quiz (ranges from 0 to 4) rise with education. College graduates do better by 0.48 
points than do individuals with no education. The middle-income respondents scored higher by 
0.11 points when compared to individuals who earn less than the minimum wage. The 
coefficients for variables that capture unreported income are statistically significant at the 1-5% 
level. Car owners, computer owners, individuals with access to hot water and the sewage system, 
those with any kind of medical insurance, and those who travelled abroad recently receive 
substantially higher test scores. In contrast to Financial knowledge, there is no difference 
between males and females in the test results. Importantly, the coefficient for being a Macri 
partisan is not statistically significant.  
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Table52.5 Determinants of economic literacy: OLS regression 
The table presents the relation of economic literacy with individual traits, such as gender, age, education, income, 
assets in ownership, consumption features, and party identification. The variables are defined in Appendix 2.6.2. 
Age dummies include dummies for the following age categories - 23-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-60 years, >60 years. 
Education dummies include dummies for the following educational degrees - Primary school, High school, College 
and Graduate school. Income dummies include dummies for the following income categories - $460-$900, $900-
$1,580, $1,580-$2,370, >$2,370 in 2018 and $280-$580, $580-$1,000, $1,000-$1,500, >$1,500 in 2019. Asset 
dummies include dummies for Home, Car, Computer, Hot water, and Sewage system. Consumption dummies 
include dummies for Commercial insurance, Social or Employer-sponsored insurance, Private school, Public 
School and categorical variables for Nutrition and Travel. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
Dependent variable:  Economic knowledge 
 
2019 2019 
   (1) (2) 
Male 0.045 0.044 
 
(0.039) (0.039) 
Macri partisan 
 
-0.023 
  
(0.065) 
Age dummies Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y 
R
2
 0.116 0.116 
Number of observations 3725 3725 
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In Table 2.6, I present the determinants of the attitudes towards the pro-market economic 
policies with Economic knowledge as an explanatory variable. Each correctly answered question 
on the quiz adds 1.8 percentage points to the support for the open economy, 1.6 percentage 
points to the elimination of subsidies, and 4.2 percentage points to the debt payment. When I add 
a dummy for Macri partisan, the magnitude of the coefficient for Economic knowledge does not 
change. If the coefficients of Economic knowledge and Financial knowledge are multiplied by 
their respective one standard deviation, their magnitude appears to be very similar.  
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Table62.6 The effect of economic knowledge: OLS regression (Panel A) 
The table presents the relation between economic education and the attitude towards the elimination of the trade 
barriers (Panel A), the elimination of subsidies (Panel B), and the debt payment (Panel C). The variables are defined 
in Appendix 2.6.2. Age dummies include dummies for the following age categories - 23-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-
60 years, >60 years. Education dummies include dummies for the following educational degrees - Primary school, 
High school, College and Graduate school. Income dummies include dummies for the following income categories - 
$460-$900, $900-$1,580, $1,580-$2,370, >$2,370 in 2018 and $280-$580, $580-$1,000, $1,000-$1,500, >$1,500 in 
2019. Asset dummies include dummies for Home, Car, Computer, Hot water, and Sewage system. Consumption 
dummies include dummies for Commercial insurance, Social or Employer-sponsored insurance, Private school, 
Public School and categorical variables for Nutrition and Travel. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
Panel A 
Dependent variable:  Approve open economy 
 
2019 2019 
 
(1) (2) 
Economic knowledge 0.018 0.018 
 
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Male 0.046 0.050 
 
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.298 
  
(0.025)*** 
Age dummies Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y 
R
2
 0.085 0.119 
Number of observations 3725 3725 
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Table 2.6 The effect of economic knowledge: OLS regression (Panel B and C) 
Panel B 
Dependent variable:  Approve elimination of subsidies 
  (1) (2) 
Economic education 0.016 0.017 
 
(0.007)** (0.007)** 
Male 0.007 0.011 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Macri partisan 
 
0.293 
  
(0.027)*** 
Age dummies Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y 
R
2
 0.079 0.109 
Number of observations 3725 3725 
Panel C 
Dependent variable:  Approve debt payment 
  (1) (2) 
Economic education 0.042 0.043 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male 0.028 0.032 
 
(0.016)* (0.016)** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.262 
  
(0.027)*** 
Age dummies Y Y 
Education dummies Y Y 
Income dummies Y Y 
Asset dummies Y Y 
Consumption dummies Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y 
R
2
 0.083 0.106 
Number of observations 3725 3725 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
The role of information in individual’s preferences is a fundamental question about democracy. 
However, it is challenging to estimate the effect of it because it is often confounded with 
political preferences. People may choose what and from whom to learn. Therefore, the amount 
and nature of knowledge they have can be a function of their political inclinations rather than a 
cause for their positions on issues. At the same time, we have some evidence that knowledge, 
however acquired, matters for political choices. People with relevant knowledge hold different 
opinions than they would hold otherwise. 
In this chapter, I find that financially and economically educated people are more likely 
to support pro-market economic policies, such as the elimination of the trade barriers, the 
elimination of subsidies, and the repayment of international debt. I use evidence from the surveys 
of 3,840 and 3,725 individuals in Argentina interviewed in 2018 and 2019. I demonstrate that 
financial and economic knowledge is not correlated with partisanship. I use the sharp economic 
decline between the two surveys to examine the possibility that financially educated people are 
simply policy winners and they support pro-market policies because they stand to gain rather 
than because they are knowledgeable. I show that the distribution between winners and losers 
due to the economic situation changed significantly from 2018 to 2019. However, the 
relationship between financial education and preferences for economic policies remains 
economically and statistically significant.  
My analysis suggests that knowledge need not be directly related to politics and policy-
specific facts for it to affect opinions. Knowledge of fundamental concepts in a field of study can 
also have an effect on a relevant set of policy preferences. At least, financial and economic 
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education increases approval for pro-market economic policies. These findings do not contradict 
the view that elite cues and group-based identities are key in opinion formation. However, they 
do suggest that the effect of knowledge may be substantial. 
 
2.6 Appendix 
2.6.1 Sampling 
 
I conducted three surveys in the months of January and February in 2017, 2018, and 2019 in 
which 2,892, 3,840, and 3,725 individuals participated, respectively (in this chapter I use the last 
two waves). The surveys were carried out in 30 localities in the city of Buenos Aires, in Greater 
Buenos Aires, and in the Buenos Aires province. Forty six percent of Argentineans live in this 
region.
24
 I fielded the survey in 14 of 15 districts (comunas) in the city of Buenos Aires.
25
 I took 
a random sample for localities in Greater Buenos Aires and in the Buenos Aires province.
26
 
These localities were stratified by poverty level to maximize the variability in the explanatory 
variables. I randomly selected two localities from Greater Buenos Aires and two localities from 
the province in each quartile of the poverty level with a higher probability to be selected for 
more densely populated places. As a result, 8 localities were selected out of 24 localities that 
constitute the Greater Buenos Aires area. Additionally, 8 localities were sampled from 111 
provincial municipalities. Including the 14 districts in the city of Buenos Aires, 30 localities were 
selected in total. Within these localities, people were surveyed during weekdays in public places, 
                                                          
24
 The population of the city of Buenos Aires is 2.9 million people; the population of the Buenos Aires metropolitan 
area (excluding the city of Buenos Aires) is 9.9 million; the population of the Buenos Aires province (excluding the 
Buenos Aires metropolitan area) is 6.8 million. 
25
 Comuna 1 was omitted because there are many tourist attractions and offices in this district. Thus, many people 
who are present in the streets during working hours do not live there. 
26 Only localities located within 200 km from the city of Buenos Aires were selected in the Buenos Aires province 
due to budget constraints. 
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i.e. the main square or the main street. In each locality, approximately 100-120 respondents 
participated in the survey. The surveyors first verified that respondents were Argentines older 
than 18. Respondents then completed the survey on their own. Illiterate participants or those who 
could not read and/or write themselves were assisted by the enumerators in completing the 
survey.  
A street-based intercept survey is an alternative to a household survey. Several studies 
show that this method does not produce biased results and may, in fact, provide access to hard-
to-reach segments of the population (Miller et al., 1997, Denstadli, 2000, McKenzie and 
Mistiaen, 2009). One potential problems with this type of survey is that certain types of 
individuals are rarely found on the streets. For example, upper-class individuals are unlikely to 
appear in public places. However, the failure to reach top income quintiles is a general problem 
of all surveys, including household surveys. Guriev and Rachinsky (2006) compare inequality 
estimates obtained through household surveys and objective income data prepared by the Tax 
Service. They find that surveys do not provide accurate measures because the wealthiest 
individuals are not included in the sample. It is also hard to reach car owners with a street 
intercept survey. However, individuals in modern cities spend a lot of time out of their cars. 
According to the Association of Car Producers, car owners constitute 40.1% of the population of 
the city of Buenos Aires and the Buenos Aires province. In my samples, 38.7% of respondents 
are car owners in 2017, 41% in 2018, and 34.4% in 2019.   
Street-based intercept surveys have several advantages compared to household surveys; 
these benefits outweigh any disadvantages. First, according to a 2006 study by the National 
University of General Sarmiento, at least 8.7% of the population in Buenos Aires and Greater 
Buenos Aires live in so-called ―villas‖ (slums). It is problematic to survey households located in 
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these zones because they lack the maps needed for probability sampling and are generally 
unsafe. Second, it is easier to find the economically active population on the local main street 
during working hours than at home. Finally, middle and upper classes in Argentina tend to live 
either in buildings with 24-hour security or in gated communities. Thus, they are more accessible 
when out of their homes. 
 
2.6.2 Description of variables used in the analysis 
 
Open_economy_approval is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent chooses ―yes‖ to 
the question ― ―Do you or don’t you approve of the elimination of export and import restrictions 
(the abolishment of export quotes, end of capital control, introduction of zero export tariffs for 
meat, grains, etc.)?‖ and 0 if otherwise (―no‖ or ‖do not know‖ ). 
Subsidies_cut_approval is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent chooses ―yes‖ to the 
question ― ―Do you or don’t you approve of the reduction of public service subsidies in 
Argentina (subsidies of electricity, gas, water, public transportation)?‖and 0 if otherwise (―no‖ or 
‖do not know‖ ). 
Debt_payment_approval is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent chooses ―yes‖ to 
the question ― ―Do you or don’t you approve of Argentina’s payment of the historic debt to 
holdout bondholders?‖ and 0 if otherwise (―no‖ or ‖do not know‖ ). 
Financial knowledge is a variable that ranges from 0 (for respondents who did not give any 
correct answer to the financial literacy test questions) to 4 (for respondents who answered all 
questions correctly). 
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Economic knowledge is a variable that ranges from 0 (for respondents who did not give any 
correct answer to the economic literacy test questions) to 4 (for respondents who answered all 
questions correctly). 
Male is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent is male. 
Age <23 years, 23-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-60 years, >60 years are dummies for different 
categories of age. 
No education, Primary school, High school, College and Graduate school degree are dummies 
for different levels of education. 
Income <$460, Income $460-$900, Income $900-$1,580, Income $1,580-$2,370, Income 
>$2,370 are dummies for different categories of income in 2018. Income <$280, Income $280-
$580, Income $580-$1,000, Income $1,000-$1,500, Income >$1,500 are dummies for different 
categories of income in 2019. 
Home, Car, Computer, Hot water, Sewage system are dummies for home owners, car owners, 
computer owners and individuals with access to hot water and sewage system, respectively. 
Nutrition is a categorical variable that is equal to 2 if a respondent ―always has enough food for 
herself and her family‖, 1 if she ―sometimes does not have enough‖, and 0 if ―often does not 
have enough‖. 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance and Commercial medical insurance are dummies for 
individuals with access to social or employer-sponsored insurance or commercial medical 
insurance, respectively. 
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Private school and public school are dummies for individuals who send their kids to private 
schools and public schools, respectively. 
Travel is a categorical variable that is equal to 0 if a respondent did not travel abroad during the 
last two years, 1 if she travelled to neighboring countries, and 2 if she travelled to Europe, North 
America, or Asia. 
Macri partisan is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent chooses the party Let’s 
Change to the question ― ―Is there any political party you feel closer to than others?‖. 
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Table72.6.3 Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
The table compares summary statistics of the explanatory and dependent variables between the 2018 sample 
(column (1)) and the 2019 sample (column (2)).  The variables are defined in Appendix 2.6.2. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard deviations of the variables.  
  2018 2019 
  (1) (2) 
Male 0.496 0.464 
 
(0.5) (0.499) 
>23 years 0.147 0.150 
 
(0.354) (0.357) 
24-35 years 0.278 0.248 
 
(0.448) (0.432) 
36-45 years 0.180 0.161 
 
(0.384) (0.367) 
46-60  years 0.192 0.213 
 
(0.394) (0.41) 
>60 years 0.203 0.228 
 
(0.403) (0.42) 
No education 0.013 0.020 
 
(0.111) (0.14) 
Primary school 0.155 0.152 
 
(0.362) (0.359) 
High school 0.468 0.453 
 
(0.499) (0.498) 
College 0.329 0.329 
 
(0.47) (0.47) 
Graduate school 0.035 0.046 
 
(0.184) (0.21) 
Income < $460/Income <$280 0.445 0.460 
 
(0.497) (0.498) 
Income $460-$900/Income $280-$580 0.266 0.237 
 
(0.442) (0.425) 
Income $900-$1,580/Income $580-$1,000 0.186 0.185 
 
(0.39) (0.388) 
Income $1,580-$2,370/Income $1,000-$1,500 0.068 0.062 
 
(0.251) (0.241) 
Income >$2,370/Income >$1,500 0.035 0.055 
 
(0.185) (0.229) 
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Table 2.6.3 Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis (continued) 
Financial knowledge 1.220 1.289 
 
(1.161) (1.131) 
Economic knowledge - 2.233 
 
- (1.164) 
Government approval 0.288 0.156 
 
(0.453) (0.363) 
Approve open economy 0.297 0.273 
 
(0.457) (0.446) 
Approve elimination of subsidies 0.347 0.330 
 
(0.476) (0.47) 
Approve debt payment 0.383 0.340 
 
(0.486) (0.474) 
Home  0.596 0.556 
 
(0.491) (0.497) 
Car 0.410 0.344 
 
(0.492) (0.475) 
Computer 0.609 0.532 
 
(0.488) (0.499) 
Nutrition 1.697 1.611 
 
(0.539) (0.608) 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance 0.528 0.494 
 
(0.499) (0.5) 
Commercial medical insurance  0.150 0.153 
 
(0.357) (0.36) 
Private school 0.125 0.124 
 
(0.331) (0.329) 
Travel 0.295 0.283 
 
(0.566) (0.566) 
Kirchner partisans 0.166 0.172 
 
(0.372) (0.378) 
Macri partisans 0.143 0.088 
 
(0.35) (0.283) 
No partisan 0.506 0.506 
 
(0.5) (0.5) 
Number of observations 3840 3725 
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Table82.6.4 Determinants of financial literacy: OLS regression (full version) 
The table presents the relation of financial literacy to individual traits, such as gender, age, education, income, assets 
in ownership, consumption features, and party identification. The variables are defined in Appendix 2.6.2. No 
degree, Income <$460/Income <$280, and Age <23 years dummies have been dropped and serve as comparison 
bases for coefficients of the level of education, income, and other age categories, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
Dependent variable:  Financial knowledge 
 
2018 2018 2019 2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 0.186 0.188 0.149 0.149 
 
(0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** 
24-35 years 0.022 0.023 0.106 0.105 
 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059)* (0.059)* 
36-45 years -0.115 -0.114 0.037 0.036 
 
(0.065)* (0.065)* (0.066) (0.066) 
46-60  years -0.230 -0.229 0.092 0.091 
 
(0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.062) (0.062) 
>60 years -0.266 -0.267 -0.041 -0.044 
 
(0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.063) (0.063) 
Primary school 0.221 0.220 0.228 0.226 
 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.132)* (0.132)* 
High school 0.322 0.319 0.285 0.282 
 
(0.155)** (0.155)** (0.128)** (0.128)** 
College 0.453 0.450 0.410 0.408 
 
(0.158)*** (0.158)*** (0.13)*** (0.13)*** 
Graduate school 0.550 0.548 0.533 0.533 
 
(0.18)*** (0.18)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** 
$460-$900/$280-$580 0.294 0.292 0.183 0.182 
 
(0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.048)*** 
$900-$1,580/$580-
$1,000 
0.323 0.321 0.209 0.207 
(0.053)*** (0.053)*** (0.053)*** (0.053)*** 
$1,580-$2,370/$1,000-
$1,500 
0.402 0.397 0.387 0.387 
(0.078)*** (0.078)*** (0.081)*** (0.081)*** 
>$2,370/>1,500 0.359 0.356 0.212 0.210 
 
(0.104)*** (0.104)*** (0.085)** (0.085)** 
     
     
      
56 
 
Table 2.6.4 Determinants of financial literacy: OLS regression (full version, 
continued) 
Home 0.085 0.085 0.036 0.035 
 
(0.038)** (0.038)** (0.038) (0.038) 
Car 0.095 0.094 0.109 0.109 
 
(0.041)** (0.041)** (0.043)** (0.043)** 
Computer 0.244 0.242 0.245 0.245 
 
(0.045)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
Hot water 0.142 0.142 0.159 0.158 
 
(0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.052)*** 
Sewage system 0.104 0.103 0.181 0.182 
 
(0.046)** (0.046)** (0.047)*** (0.047)*** 
Nutrition -0.006 -0.008 0.040 0.039 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) 
Social or employer-
sponsored insurance  
0.005 0.005 0.050 0.050 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Commercial insurance 0.187 0.183 0.176 0.176 
 
(0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** 
Private school  0.132 0.130 -0.097 -0.098 
 
(0.056)** (0.056)** (0.057)* (0.057)* 
Public school 0.035 0.037 -0.067 -0.067 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
Travel 0.249 0.245 0.086 0.084 
 
(0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.034)** (0.034)** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.061 
 
0.042 
  
(0.05) 
 
(0.062) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.197 0.197 0.151 0.151 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3725 3725 
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Table92.6.5 Determinants of the pro-market policies approval: OLS regressions (full 
version) 
The table presents the relation between financial education and the attitude towards the elimination of trade barriers 
(Panel A), the elimination of subsidies (Panel B), and the debt payment (Panel C). The variables are defined in 
Appendix 2.6.2. No degree, Income <$460/<$280, and Age <23 years dummies have been dropped and serve as 
comparison bases for coefficients for the level of education and income and other age categories. The numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable:  Approve open economy 
 
2018 2018 2019 2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financial knowledge 0.039 0.037 0.025 0.024 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male 0.020 0.033 0.043 0.047 
 
(0.015) (0.015)** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
24-35 years 0.044 0.051 0.032 0.028 
 
(0.024)* (0.023)** (0.024) (0.024) 
36-45 years 0.088 0.095 0.081 0.073 
 
(0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.026)*** 
46-60  years 0.151 0.152 0.104 0.098 
 
(0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
>60 years 0.164 0.159 0.160 0.143 
 
(0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** 
Primary school 0.013 0.008 -0.072 -0.084 
 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.054) (0.053) 
High school 0.023 0.011 -0.079 -0.097 
 
(0.064) (0.062) (0.052) (0.051)* 
College 0.039 0.024 -0.073 -0.091 
 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.053) (0.052)* 
Graduate school 0.013 0.004 -0.043 -0.046 
 
(0.075) (0.073) (0.061) (0.06) 
$460-$900/$280-$580 0.013 0.008 0.033 0.025 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.02)* (0.019) 
$900-$1,580/$580-$1,000 0.059 0.049 -0.010 -0.022 
 
(0.022)*** (0.022)** (0.022) (0.021) 
$1,580-$2,370/$1,000-$1,500 0.041 0.018 -0.012 -0.017 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
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Table 2.6.5 Determinants of the pro-market policies approval: OLS regression (full 
version, continued)  
>$2,370/>1,500 0.102 0.084 0.091 0.077 
 
(0.043)** (0.042)** (0.035)*** (0.034)** 
Home 0.001 -0.001 0.020 0.011 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Car 0.026 0.020 -0.047 -0.049 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018)*** (0.017)*** 
Computer 0.032 0.024 0.040 0.039 
 
(0.019)* (0.018) (0.019)** (0.018)** 
Hot water -0.015 -0.016 0.028 0.019 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Sewage system 0.012 0.009 -0.029 -0.022 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Nutrition 0.052 0.041 0.062 0.055 
 
(0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance 
0.023 0.024 0.029 0.031 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)* 
Commercial insurance 0.068 0.051 0.102 0.101 
 
(0.026)*** (0.025)** (0.025)*** (0.024)*** 
Private school 0.043 0.030 0.036 0.028 
 
(0.023)* (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Public school -0.044 -0.034 0.007 0.010 
 
(0.018)** (0.018)* (0.018) (0.018) 
Travel 0.074 0.055 0.053 0.043 
 
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.310 
 
0.297 
  
(0.02)*** 
 
(0.025)*** 
R
2
 0.110 0.162 0.086 0.120 
Panel B 
Dependent variable:  Approve elimination of subsidies 
Financial knowledge 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.033 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male -0.002 0.012 0.003 0.007 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
24-35 years 0.045 0.051 0.011 0.007 
 
(0.025)* (0.024)** (0.025) (0.025) 
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Table 2.6.5 Determinants of the pro-market policies approval: OLS regression (full 
version, continued)  
36-45 years 0.084 0.091 0.021 0.013 
 
(0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.028) (0.028) 
46-60  years 0.127 0.128 0.079 0.073 
 
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.026)*** 
>60 years 0.176 0.171 0.142 0.125 
 
(0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** 
Primary school 0.047 0.042 0.024 0.011 
 
(0.069) (0.067) (0.057) (0.056) 
High school 0.070 0.058 0.069 0.051 
 
(0.067) (0.065) (0.055) (0.054) 
College 0.077 0.060 0.062 0.045 
 
(0.069) (0.066) (0.056) (0.056) 
Graduate school 0.058 0.050 0.015 0.011 
 
(0.078) (0.076) (0.065) (0.064) 
$460-$900/$280-$580 -0.002 -0.008 0.048 0.040 
 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.021)** (0.02)** 
$900-$1,580/$580-$1,000 0.076 0.065 0.019 0.008 
 
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023) (0.023) 
$1,580-$2,370/$1,000-$1,500 0.081 0.057 0.023 0.018 
 
(0.034)** (0.033)* (0.035) (0.034) 
>$2,370/>1,500 0.064 0.045 0.086 0.072 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.037)** (0.036)** 
Home 0.010 0.007 0.034 0.027 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)** (0.016) 
Car 0.051 0.045 -0.038 -0.040 
 
(0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.019)** (0.018)** 
Computer 0.024 0.015 0.037 0.036 
 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.02)* (0.019)* 
Hot water -0.019 -0.020 0.025 0.017 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Sewage system 0.025 0.022 -0.060 -0.054 
 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Nutrition 0.043 0.032 0.070 0.063 
 
(0.015)*** (0.015)** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance 
0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
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Table 2.6.5 Determinants of the pro-market policies approval: OLS regression (full 
version, continued)  
Commercial insurance 0.048 0.030 0.141 0.141 
 
(0.027)* (0.026) (0.026)*** (0.026)*** 
Private school 0.038 0.025 0.069 0.061 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)*** (0.024)** 
Public school -0.044 -0.033 0.009 0.011 
 
(0.019)** (0.018)* (0.019) (0.019) 
Travel 0.071 0.051 0.048 0.038 
 
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.331 
 
0.291 
  
(0.021)*** 
 
(0.026)*** 
R
2
 0.100 0.155 0.083 0.112 
Panel C 
Dependent variable:  Approve debt payment 
Financial knowledge 0.037 0.035 0.041 0.040 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male 0.020 0.032 0.024 0.028 
 
(0.017) (0.016)* (0.016) (0.016)* 
24-35 years 0.019 0.025 -0.028 -0.031 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
36-45 years -0.034 -0.027 -0.071 -0.078 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)** (0.028)*** 
46-60  years -0.055 -0.053 -0.068 -0.074 
 
(0.029)* (0.028)* (0.027)** (0.027)*** 
>60 years 0.018 0.014 -0.005 -0.020 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Primary school -0.024 -0.029 -0.031 -0.041 
 
(0.071) (0.07) (0.058) (0.057) 
High school 0.037 0.026 0.037 0.021 
 
(0.07) (0.069) (0.056) (0.055) 
College 0.041 0.026 0.040 0.024 
 
(0.071) (0.07) (0.057) (0.056) 
Graduate school -0.003 -0.010 -0.046 -0.049 
 
(0.082) (0.08) (0.066) (0.065) 
$460-$900/$280-$580 0.029 0.024 -0.009 -0.016 
 
(0.021) (0.02) (0.021) (0.021) 
$900-$1,580/$580-$1,000 0.056 0.047 -0.002 -0.012 
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Table 2.6.5 Determinants of the pro-market policies approval: OLS regression (full 
version, continued)  
$1,580-$2,370/$1,000-$1,500 0.063 0.041 -0.019 -0.024 
 
(0.036)* (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
>$2,370/>1,500 0.078 0.061 0.070 0.058 
 
(0.047)* (0.046) (0.037)* (0.037) 
Home 0.030 0.028 0.032 0.025 
 
(0.017)* (0.017)* (0.017)* (0.016) 
Car 0.054 0.048 -0.025 -0.027 
 
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019) (0.019) 
Computer 0.034 0.026 0.035 0.034 
 
(0.021)* (0.02) (0.02)* (0.019)* 
Hot water 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.007 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Sewage system -0.020 -0.023 0.035 0.040 
 
(0.021) (0.02) (0.021)* (0.02)** 
Nutrition 0.044 0.034 0.068 0.062 
 
(0.016)*** (0.016)** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance 
0.026 0.027 0.013 0.015 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Commercial insurance 0.029 0.013 0.112 0.111 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026)*** (0.026)*** 
Private school 0.034 0.022 0.070 0.063 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
Public school -0.024 -0.014 0.011 0.013 
 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.02) (0.019) 
Travel 0.020 0.002 0.032 0.023 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)** (0.014) 
Macri partisan 
 
0.301 
 
0.260 
  
(0.022)*** 
 
(0.027)*** 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.064 0.107 0.081 0.104 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3725 3725 
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Table102.6.6 Determinants of approval of market-oriented policies: logit regression 
(marginal effects reported) 
The table presents the relation between financial education and the attitude towards the elimination of trade barriers 
(Panel A), the elimination of subsidies (Panel B), and the debt payment (Panel C). The variables are defined in 
Appendix 2.6.2. No degree, Income <$460, and Age <23 years dummies have been dropped and serve as 
comparison bases for coefficients for the level of education, income and other age categories. The numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable:  Approve open economy 
 
2018 2018 2019 2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financial knowledge 0.038 0.038 0.025 0.025 
 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Male 0.024 0.039 0.047 0.053 
 
(0.016) (0.017)** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
24-35 years 0.053 0.067 0.043 0.038 
 
(0.029)* (0.03)** (0.029) (0.029) 
36-45 years 0.108 0.127 0.101 0.094 
 
(0.034)*** (0.036)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** 
46-60  years 0.179 0.195 0.129 0.123 
 
(0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** 
>60 years 0.190 0.200 0.185 0.169 
 
(0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** 
Primary school 0.010 0.004 -0.068 -0.077 
 
(0.075) (0.076) (0.045) (0.043)* 
High school 0.022 0.008 -0.081 -0.098 
 
(0.073) (0.074) (0.049)* (0.048)** 
College 0.037 0.020 -0.075 -0.090 
 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.048) (0.046)* 
Graduate school 0.010 0.000 -0.046 -0.046 
 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.052) (0.051) 
$460-$900/$280-$580 0.018 0.013 0.034 0.026 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
$900-$1,580/$580-$1,000 0.059 0.050 -0.009 -0.021 
 
(0.025)** (0.025)** (0.022) (0.022) 
$1,580-$2,370/$1,000-$1,500 0.032 0.011 -0.014 -0.019 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) 
>$2,370/>1,500 0.086 0.071 0.079 0.070 
 
(0.049)* (0.05) (0.038)** (0.038)* 
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Table 2.6.6 Determinants of approval of market-oriented policies: logit regression 
(marginal effects reported, continued) 
Home 0.000 -0.002 0.019 0.011 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Car 0.027 0.023 -0.050 -0.053 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
Computer 0.034 0.027 0.043 0.043 
 
(0.02)* (0.021) (0.019)** (0.019)** 
Hot water -0.014 -0.016 0.033 0.024 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
Sewage system 0.011 0.007 -0.032 -0.025 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Nutrition 0.071 0.058 0.075 0.067 
 
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance 
0.035 0.037 0.037 0.040 
(0.02)* (0.02)* (0.019)* (0.019)** 
Commercial insurance 0.075 0.061 0.110 0.113 
 
(0.03)** (0.03)** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** 
Private school 0.039 0.028 0.037 0.029 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Public school -0.052 -0.041 0.007 0.010 
 
(0.019)*** (0.02)** (0.02) (0.02) 
Travel 0.067 0.053 0.048 0.040 
 
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.325 
 
0.307 
  
(0.025)*** 
 
(0.031)*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.092 0.133 0.075 0.102 
Panel B 
Dependent variable:  Approve elimination of subsidies 
Financial knowledge 0.041 0.041 0.035 0.035 
 
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
Male -0.001 0.014 0.003 0.008 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
24-35 years 0.050 0.064 0.013 0.007 
 
(0.029)* (0.031)** (0.028) (0.029) 
36-45 years 0.096 0.115 0.021 0.013 
 
(0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.032) (0.032) 
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Table 2.6.6 Determinants of approval of market-oriented policies: logit regression 
(marginal effects reported, continued) 
46-60  years 0.145 0.159 0.087 0.081 
 
(0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** 
>60 years 0.196 0.207 0.152 0.138 
 
(0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** 
Primary school 0.060 0.055 0.019 0.006 
 
(0.086) (0.088) (0.064) (0.063) 
High school 0.084 0.072 0.069 0.051 
 
(0.08) (0.083) (0.061) (0.06) 
College 0.091 0.075 0.061 0.044 
 
(0.084) (0.086) (0.063) (0.063) 
Graduate school 0.074 0.068 0.013 0.009 
 
(0.098) (0.101) (0.071) (0.071) 
$460-$900/$280-$580 0.000 -0.007 0.052 0.044 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)** (0.023)* 
$900-$1,580/$580-$1,000 0.079 0.071 0.021 0.009 
 
(0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.025) (0.025) 
$1,580-$2,370/$1,000-$1,500 0.080 0.061 0.022 0.017 
 
(0.038)** (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) 
>$2,370/>1,500 0.058 0.041 0.085 0.074 
 
(0.05) (0.051) (0.041)** (0.041)* 
Home 0.009 0.008 0.036 0.029 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017)** (0.018) 
Car 0.054 0.051 -0.040 -0.044 
 
(0.019)*** (0.02)*** (0.019)** (0.02)** 
Computer 0.026 0.018 0.039 0.039 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021)* (0.021)* 
Hot water -0.020 -0.023 0.029 0.020 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) 
Sewage system 0.027 0.024 -0.068 -0.062 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)*** (0.023)*** 
Nutrition 0.054 0.041 0.082 0.075 
 
(0.018)*** (0.018)** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance 
0.006 0.006 0.002 0.004 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.02) (0.021) 
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Table 2.6.6 Determinants of approval of market-oriented policies: logit regression 
(marginal effects reported, continued) 
Commercial insurance 0.050 0.035 0.144 0.150 
 
(0.03)* (0.031) (0.03)*** (0.03)*** 
Private school 0.038 0.025 0.073 0.067 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)*** (0.028)** 
Public school -0.050 -0.039 0.009 0.012 
 
(0.02)** (0.021)* (0.021) (0.022) 
Travel 0.069 0.055 0.047 0.039 
 
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
Macri partisan 
 
0.356 
 
0.308 
  
(0.024)*** 
 
(0.031)*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.079 0.121 0.067 0.089 
Panel C 
Dependent variable:  Approve debt payment 
Financial knowledge 0.037 0.037 0.041 0.042 
 
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
Male 0.020 0.035 0.026 0.031 
 
(0.017) (0.018)** (0.017) (0.017)* 
24-35 years 0.018 0.026 -0.032 -0.036 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) 
36-45 years -0.039 -0.032 -0.080 -0.087 
 
(0.03) (0.031) (0.028)*** (0.028)*** 
46-60  years -0.060 -0.061 -0.074 -0.081 
 
(0.029)** (0.03)** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** 
>60 years 0.017 0.015 -0.007 -0.023 
 
(0.03) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) 
Primary school -0.024 -0.031 -0.045 -0.056 
 
(0.079) (0.08) (0.061) (0.06) 
High school 0.046 0.034 0.037 0.021 
 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.062) (0.062) 
College 0.049 0.033 0.038 0.023 
 
(0.082) (0.083) (0.064) (0.063) 
Graduate school 0.006 -0.005 -0.050 -0.053 
 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.066) (0.066) 
$460-$900/$280-$580 0.033 0.029 -0.008 -0.017 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
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Table 2.6.6 Determinants of approval of market-oriented policies: logit regression 
(marginal effects reported, continued) 
$900-$1,580/$580-$1,000 0.060 0.052 -0.003 -0.013 
 
(0.026)** (0.026)* (0.024) (0.024) 
$1,580-$2,370/$1,000-$1,500 0.066 0.045 -0.021 -0.026 
 
(0.038)* (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) 
>$2,370/>1,500 0.081 0.066 0.069 0.060 
 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.041)* (0.041) 
Home 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.028 
 
(0.018)* (0.018)* (0.018)* (0.018) 
Car 0.055 0.051 -0.029 -0.031 
 
(0.019)*** (0.02)*** (0.019) (0.02) 
Computer 0.036 0.029 0.036 0.035 
 
(0.022)* (0.022) (0.021)* (0.021)* 
Hot water 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.007 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Sewage system -0.022 -0.025 0.036 0.044 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)* (0.022)** 
Nutrition 0.052 0.041 0.082 0.076 
 
(0.018)*** (0.018)** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
Social or employer-sponsored insurance 
0.030 0.032 0.018 0.020 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.02) (0.02) 
Commercial insurance 0.031 0.015 0.117 0.119 
 
(0.03) (0.031) (0.03)*** (0.03)*** 
Private school 0.035 0.024 0.075 0.069 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)*** (0.028)** 
Public school -0.027 -0.016 0.013 0.016 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Travel 0.018 0.001 0.029 0.021 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)** (0.015) 
Macri partisan 
 
0.315 
 
0.276 
  
(0.024)*** 
 
(0.031)*** 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.049 0.082 0.066 0.084 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3725 3725 
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Table112.6.7 The effect of financial knowledge on pro-market policies 
approval: propensity score matching regression 
The table presents the relation between financial knowledge and the attitude towards the elimination of trade 
barriers, the elimination of subsidies, and the debt payment for the 2018 and 2019 samples. The variables are 
defined in Appendix 2.6.2. Observations with score ―1‖ in the financial literacy test are dropped. The treated group 
includes respondents who scored at least 2 on the test (1,409 observations in 2018 and 1,464 in 2019). The control 
group includes respondents who scored 0 on the test (1,334 observations in 2018 and 1,127 in 2019). The matched 
sample is constructed on the 1:1 basis. 
  2018 2019 
  Unmatched sample Unmatched sample 
  Treated Controls Dif. t-stat Treated Controls Dif. t-stat 
Open economy 0.383 0.217 0.167 9.65 0.320 0.222 0.098 5.55 
Elimination of 
subsidies 
0.432 0.259 0.174 9.7 0.379 0.252 0.127 6.91 
Debt payment 0.471 0.289 0.181 9.93 0.417 0.243 0.174 9.42 
  Matched sample  Matched sample  
Open economy 0.383 0.247 0.136 2.69 0.320 0.173 0.146 3.13 
Elimination of 
subsidies 
0.432 0.293 0.139 2.57 0.379 0.273 0.107 2.12 
Debt payment 0.471 0.367 0.104 1.88 0.417 0.253 0.164 3.3 
  Matching variables Matching variables 
  Mean     Mean     
  Treated Control %Bias t-test Treated Control %Bias t-test 
Male  0.572 0.599 -5.4 -1.45 0.510 0.510 -0.1 -0.04 
Age 2.882 2.891 -0.6 -0.17 3.123 3.077 3.3 0.91 
Education  3.434 3.427 0.8 0.24 3.391 3.400 -1 0.28 
Income 2.347 2.363 -1.5 -0.37 2.274 2.278 -0.4 -0.09 
Macri partisan 0 0.15543 8.5 2.11 0.103 0.089 5.2 1.32 
Number of 
observations 
2,743 2,591 
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CHAPTER 3 
The effect of relevant information on policy preferences: 
Experimental evidence 
 
In Chapter 2, I present the observational evidence of the effect of knowledge on policy 
preferences. I demonstrate that in contemporary Argentina my measure of knowledge is 
uncorrelated with another important driver for policy preferences – party identification. I conduct 
analysis in two different contexts – economic boom and recession - to address the issue of 
possible confoundedness with economic policy preferences and economic interests. In this 
chapter, I aim to establish a causal link between providing people with relevant information and 
a shift in their preferences for pro-market economic policies. In the 2018 and 2019 surveys, I 
conduct two survey experiments in which I ―educate‖ randomly selected respondents about the 
impact of anti-market policies on the national economy and individual well-being. In both 
surveys two identical treatments were included - ―an economic lesson‖ or ―a case study‖ of 
Venezuela. My hypothesis is that this information would make respondents more supportive for 
pro-market economic policies recently implemented by the Argentine government.  
In the 2018 survey, respondents in the treatment groups were, indeed, more likely to 
support two out of three economic policies in question - the elimination of trade restrictions and 
the repayment of the debt. Respondents who received ―an economic lesson‖ had a higher 
probability of approving the open economy by 8.3 points and the debt payment by 9.6 points. 
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Those who read about Venezuela’s experience had a higher probability of favoring the open 
economy by 10.2 points and the debt payment by 8.8 points. In the survey carried out a year 
later, results do not reach the conventional level of significance, even though there were 45% 
more observations in both treatment and control groups, though the signs of the coefficients of 
the treatment dummies are consistent with the hypothesis. Respondents who were assigned to 
―an economic lesson‖ are more supportive of the elimination of trade barriers by 5 points 
(marginally significant at the 19% level), the elimination of subsidies by 10 points (significant at 
the 5% level), and the debt payment by 5.8 points (marginally significant at the 14% level). 
Those assigned to the ―Venezuela‖ treatment demonstrate more support for the debt payment by 
5.3 points (marginally significant at the 17.8% level). 
Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, they do suggest that there is a 
causal link between relevant information and policy preferences. Respondents assigned to one of 
the treatments that discuss consequences of the anti-market policies are more likely to support 
market-oriented economic policies. Second, they demonstrate how fragile survey experimental 
results can be with respect to a special form of external validity - temporal validity. An internally 
valid causal estimate obtained at one point in time may not be externally valid for the same 
population at another point in time due to aggregate shocks that an entire population might 
experience. 
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3.1 Hypothesis and empirical strategy  
 
We have evidence that people can learn new information, and this knowledge may change their 
policy preferences (Gerber and Green, 1999, Bullock, 2009). With respect to economic 
knowledge, those who are taught about the workings of the economy are expected to look more 
favorably upon economic policies aimed to boost economic growth.  
We also have evidence of motivated reasoning when people accept information that is in 
line with their prior beliefs and ignore information that is inconsistent with their predispositions 
(Zaller, 1992, Leeper and Slothuus, 2014, Lebo and Cassino, 2007). That is why it is important 
to give a treatment that does not prime other predispositions, such as party attachments. In my 
survey, randomly selected respondents were given either ―an economic lesson‖ or ―a case study.‖  
In the ―economic lesson‖ treatment, I explain how recent economic policies of the 
country led to negative consequences for the economy. I deliberately do not mention politicians 
associated with policy initiation and refer instead to anonymous ―economists‖:  
According to economists, government subsidies and price controls for utilities lead to 
overconsumption of electricity, gas, and water on the part of consumers and little investment in 
infrastructure on the part of private companies. According to the Ministry of Energy, in 2014 
every Argentine was without electricity 33 hours per year (compared to 6 hours in 2003). 
Currency controls and export and import restrictions made Argentine farmers move to Uruguay. 
In 2010-2015 up to 50% of land in Uruguay was cultivated by Argentines. At the same time, in 
2013 in Argentina the land area dedicated to, for example, wheat was twice as low and wheat 
export was 4 times as low as it was in 2004.  
71 
 
The ―case study‖ reminds respondents of a recent experience of neighboring Venezuela. 
During the 2000s and 2010s, both Argentina and Venezuela were proud members of the so called 
―pink tide‖: Latin American countries with leftist governments who stay away from the neo-
liberal economic model. The leaders of the two countries met frequently and built ―international 
resistance‖ to ―get back on the road to utopia‖, as Hugo Chavez put it. Although Argentina never 
went as far in state intervention in the economy as did Venezuela, economic policies in the two 
countries resembled each other – nationalizations, price and currency controls, trade restrictions, 
etc. In 2015, the two countries went their separate ways. Since then, Venezuela has been 
experiencing a major humanitarian catastrophe that caused 13% of the population to leave the 
country (including around 170,000 who immigrated to Argentina). As recently as in 2008, 
Venezuela and Argentina were two middle-income countries with similar GDP per capita. Now 
Argentina is 70% wealthier. The piece presented in the survey is as follows: 
Economic policies of the Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro governments created socioeconomic 
crisis in Venezuela. Price controls, nationalization of farms, supermarkets, and manufacturing 
companies led to shortages of food, basic consumer products, and medicines. Currency controls, 
trade restrictions and one of the highest taxes in the world suppressed any business activity. As a 
result, last year inflation reached 1.37 million percent. In 2018 the economy contracted by 18%. 
Venezuelans reported losing on average 11 kilograms in body weight just during 2017. Almost 
90% now live in poverty. 
Previous research shows that some groups of the population may be particularly 
susceptible to react to a survey treatment. I estimate the treatment effect for the subgroups of 
non-partisans, less educated, less financially educated, poorer, and older respondents. Non-
partisans are more responsive to survey treatments because they have fewer considerations in 
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their head that prevent them from accepting new information (Bartels, 2002, Huber, Hill, and 
Lenz, 2012). The treatment is likely to have no effect on Macri partisans because their prior 
beliefs are aligned with those suggested by the treatment. Also, it is unlikely to have an effect on 
Macri opponents because their preconceptions make them reluctant to receive information that is 
at odds with their partisan loyalties. Another mechanism behind the heterogeneity of the 
treatment effect may originate from differences in the cognitive capacities of certain subgroups 
of the population. Krosnick (1991, 1992), Krosnick and Alwin (1987) argue that ―complex, 
abstract, and extensive cognitive activities are difficult‖ for people who lack ―cognitive skills‖ or 
―cognitive sophistication.‖ These people are less likely to elaborate and more prone for primacy, 
which means that they focus their attention on items presented recently. Specifically, respondents 
with low educational attainment are more susceptible to priming treatments (Schuman and 
Presser, 1996, Narayan and Krosnick, 1996). Knauper (1999) finds that age has a similar effect, 
possibly because of the decreasing working memory capacity of older people. Mathiowetz et al. 
(2002) note limited cognitive capacities of low-income populations.  
When individuals are supplied with information like that presented in the treatment 
vignettes and demonstrate more support for policies, their reaction can be explained by either 
priming or learning. Individuals fill their head with many different and often inconsistent 
considerations (Zaller, 1992). When a surveyor approaches with a question, they draw on 
considerations from the top of their head. The treatments make certain considerations more 
salient and respondents are primed to show more support for pro-market policies. One would 
expect this effect to be short-term. Learning implies that information has been internalized and 
has become a new position on an issue. It is challenging to distinguish the two mechanisms 
behind the treatment effect empirically. For example, we could expect that individuals with less 
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consistent political preferences (usually non-partisans) are more susceptible to priming because 
their heads are filled with arguments from both political camps. However, they may be more 
susceptible to learning because they do not have an ideology that prevents them from learning 
new information. Likewise, compared with knowledgeable individuals, respondents with less 
knowledge may learn more from the information they encounter because they have more room 
for advancement. However, they can also be more easily primed because they do not have 
enough knowledge to evaluate this information critically. Scholars use panel surveys to 
distinguish priming from learning (Lenz, 2009, Tesler, 2014). In these studies, treatments include 
an influx of messages about certain issues during campaigns rather than a short passage in a 
cross-sectional survey. They distinguish priming and learning by documenting the preservation 
of the treatment effect between panels. This method might be not suitable for survey 
experiments. Respondents would be exposed to many other considerations similar to those in a 
survey treatment between panels, and learning would be indistinguishable from priming because 
of high knowledge deterioration. The design of this study also does not permit a distinction 
between learning and priming. 
 
3.2 Covariate balance 
 
To make sure that the results presented later are due to the treatment effect and not due to 
particular sample realizations, I present the covariate balance among key variables across two 
treatment groups and the control group and across the two years. Table 3.1 displays average 
values and standard deviations of the variables. The treatment and control groups are balanced 
on demographic variables, such as gender, age, education, and income. In 2019, respondents 
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randomly assigned to both treatment groups turned out to be better financially educated, and the 
difference is statistically significant. The Government approval and the support rates of specific 
policies are defined as categorical variables. They are equal to 1 if a respondent chose ―yes‖ in 
response to the question about approval of the government or a policy, 0 if she chose ―Don’t 
know‖, and -1 if she chose ―No‖. A simple comparison reveals that support for the Open 
economy and the Debt payment is higher among individuals who received both treatments in 
2018. In 2019, the direction of change is consistent with the hypothesis regarding the treatment 
effect. However, the difference in support between the treatment and control groups is 
statistically insignificant. 
In both years, the presented survey experiments were parts of a larger project, and 
therefore the number of observations in the treatment and control groups do not add up to the 
total number of observations. In the subsequent analyses, the treatment groups are always 
compared with the control group rather than with the rest of the sample. Other treatments that are 
not discussed in this study are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
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Table123.1 Covariate balance between treatment and control groups in 2018 and 
2019  
The table compares summary statistics of the explanatory and dependent variables in the two treatment groups and 
the control group in the 2018 and the 2019 samples. Age, Education, and Income are categorical variables that range 
from 1 to 5. Financial knowledge is a categorical variable that ranges from 0 to 4. Government approval, Open 
economy, Elimination of subsidies, and Debt payment are categorical variables that range from -1 to 1. The numbers 
in parentheses are standard deviations of the variables.  
  2018 2019 
  Economic 
lesson 
Venezuela Control 
Economic 
lesson 
Venezuela Control 
  
Male 0.489 0.491 0.494 0.455 0.468 0.469 
 
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.498) (0.499) (0.499) 
Age 2.906 3.033 3.034 2.989 3.013 3.289 
 
(1.316) (1.39) (1.419) (1.402) (1.406) (1.385) 
Education 3.207 3.245 3.177 3.276 3.276 3.122 
 
(0.793) (0.779) (0.815) (0.799) (0.814) (0.864) 
Income 1.942 2.017 1.980 2.036 1.983 1.982 
 
(1.081) (1.102) (1.129) (1.177) (1.18) (1.161) 
Financial 
knowledge 
1.191 1.201 1.266 1.338 1.281 1.195 
(1.153) (1.165) (1.202) (1.13) (1.126) (1.125) 
Government 
approval 
-0.287 -0.215 -0.237 -0.467 -0.530 -0.507 
(0.845) (0.874) (0.877) (0.744) (0.712) (0.773) 
Open economy 
-0.154 -0.108 -0.203 -0.206 -0.235 -0.249 
(0.86) (0.878) (0.857) (0.853) (0.832) (0.846) 
Subsidies cut 
-0.183 -0.182 -0.183 -0.166 -0.291 -0.277 
(0.912) (0.931) (0.931) (0.936) (0.902) (0.909) 
Debt payment 
0.044 0.049 -0.040 -0.055 -0.073 -0.152 
(0.876) (0.871) (0.879) (0.868) (0.86) (0.87) 
Number of 
observations 
638 636 654 923 923 951 
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3.2 Results 
 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the survey experiment in 2018. People who read the piece about 
the consequences of subsidized utilities and import and export restrictions (―an economic 
lesson‖) are more likely to support the opening of the economy and the debt payment. The 
coefficient for the ―economic lesson‖ dummy is 8.3 and statistically significant at the 10% level 
when the opening of the economy approval is a dependent variable. The support for the Debt 
payment is 9.6 points higher than that in the control group, and the coefficient for the experiment 
dummy is statistically significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, there is no effect for the 
Elimination of subsidies approval, although the piece straightforwardly discusses the distorted 
incentives for customers and companies in the presence of subsidization. It is possible that I 
observe the effect for the two policies but do not observe it for the Elimination of subsidies 
because it is easier to estimate the impact of this policy on individual well-being, and people 
have stronger opinions on the issue that are more difficult to change with a short survey 
treatment.  I fit OLS regression models to estimate the effect of the treatments on approval of the 
policies (defined as categorical variables).  
People who were reminded of the recent experience of Venezuela are also more 
supportive of the opening of the economy and the debt payment by 10.2 and 8.8 points, 
respectively. The coefficient for the ―Venezuela‖ treatment dummy is statistically significant at 
the 5% level in the regression with the opening of the economy approval as a dependent variable 
(column (1)), and at 10% with the Debt payment approval as a dependent variable (column (3)). 
There is no effect of the treatment on the Elimination of subsidies approval.  
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In the specifications without Financial knowledge as an explanatory variable, the 
―economic lesson‖ treatment also raises support for the Open economy by 7.8 points (significant 
at the 10% level) and for the Debt payment by 9.2 points (significant at the 5% level) in 2018. 
Those who read about the Venezuela experience are more likely to support the Open economy by 
9.6 points (significant at the 5% level) and the Debt payment by 8.4 points (significant at the 
10% level).
27
 In 2019, in the specifications without Financial knowledge, the treatments 
dummies are not statistically significant. 
These results suggest people’s ability to become ―economically educated‖. This research 
design does not permit for distinguishing between priming and learning effects. People who were 
assigned to treatments already could have had opinions on the issues consistent with the message 
of the pieces. The treatments just reminded them of these pre-existing opinions. Alternatively, 
they could have learned a ―lesson‖ and started looking more favorably upon the pro-market 
economic policies. Whatever the mechanism behind this relationship, the evidence shows that 
people may change their policy preferences when they encounter relevant information.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 The OLS regression specifications that do not include Financial knowledge are not reported. 
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Table133.2 The effect of the “economic lesson” and “Venezuela” treatments on 
economic policy approval in 2018: OLS regression 
The table presents the effect of the two treatments – the ―economic lesson‖ and the ―case study‖ of Venezuela - on 
the approval for the pro-market economic policies. Column (1) presents the effect on the elimination of the trade 
barriers, column (2) on the elimination of subsidies, column (3) on the debt payment. The comparison group is the 
control group rather than the rest of the sample. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Dependent variable:  Open economy Subsidies cut Debt payment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
"Venezuela" 0.102 0.007 0.088 
 
(0.045)** (0.048) (0.047)* 
"Economic lesson" 0.083 0.035 0.096 
 
(0.045)* (0.048) (0.047)** 
Financial knowledge 0.057 0.074 0.043 
 
(0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** 
Male 0.006 0.010 -0.030 
 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
Macri partisan 0.689 0.737 0.631 
 
(0.038)*** (0.041)*** (0.039)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Education dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.120 0.130 0.093 
Number of observations 3840 3840 3840 
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Table 3.3 presents the results of the survey experiment in 2019. The dummy coefficients 
for both treatments do not reach the conventional level of significance in regressions with Open 
economy and Debt payment as dependent variables. At the same time, they are relatively large in 
magnitude, and their signs are consistent with the hypothesis. The ―economic lesson‖ dummy is 
marginally significant at the 19% level for the support of the Open economy (column (1)) and at 
the 14% level for the support of the Debt payment (column (3)). Unlike in the 2018 sample, 
respondents in this condition are more supportive of the Elimination of subsides. The coefficient 
for the treatment dummy is 10.1 and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for 
the ―Venezuela‖ dummy is marginally significant at the 18% level in the regression with the 
Debt payment as a dependent variable.  
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Table143.3 The effect of the “economic lesson” and “Venezuela” treatments on 
economic policy approval in 2019: OLS regression 
The table presents the effect of the two treatments – the ―economic lesson‖ and the case study of ―Venezuela‖ - on 
the approval for the pro-market economic policies. Column (1) presents the effect on the elimination of the trade 
barriers, column (2) on the elimination of subsidies, column (3) on the debt payment. The comparison group is the 
control group rather than the rest of the sample. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Dependent variable:  Open economy Subsidies cut Debt payment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
"Venezuela" 0.028 -0.013 0.053 
 
(0.038) (0.041) (0.039) 
"Economic lesson" 0.050 0.101 0.058 
 
(0.038) (0.041)** (0.04) 
Financial knowledge 0.016 0.058 0.057 
 
(0.012) (0.013)*** (0.013)*** 
Male 0.021 0.009 0.021 
 
(0.028) (0.03) (0.029) 
Macri partisan 0.627 0.622 0.555 
 
(0.048)*** (0.052)*** (0.05)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Education dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.065 0.072 0.061 
Number of observations 3725 3725 3725 
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I repeat the analysis on several specific subsamples of the population. The results are 
consistent with previous research. Respondents who claim that they do not have a preferred party 
are more likely to support the Open economy and the Debt payment if they received one of the 
treatments, compared to non-partisans in the control group. Consistent with our knowledge of 
motivated reasoning, the treatment has no effect on Macri partisans and on Kirchner partisans 
(not reported). Respondents who receive fewer than 2 points on the financial literacy test are 
more likely to support the Open economy if they are assigned to one of the treatments, compared 
to peers with low financial knowledge in the control group. The coefficients for the treatment 
dummies are significant at the 1% on the subsample of respondents older than 46 years-old in the 
regression with the Open economy as a dependent variable. Older respondents in the treatment 
condition are also more likely to support the other two policies if they receive ―an economic 
lesson‖, as opposed to older respondents in the control group.  
In addition to subsampling, I analyze the heterogeneous effects of the treatments on the 
full sample with interaction terms between the treatments’ dummies and key controls (not 
reported). The interaction terms are not significant in most specifications. The exceptions are the 
interactions between terms with Age and No partisan dummy. Each additional age category adds 
5.2 points to the Open economy approval (significant at the 5%) among those who read about 
Venezuela and 6 points among those who received ―an economic lesson‖, compared to others 
who received treatment. The older one is, the more likely she supports the Elimination of 
subsidies if she was assigned to ―an economic lesson‖ treatment (by 8.9 points with each age 
category, significant at the 1%), and the Debt payment (by 4.4 with each age category, 
significant at the 10%), compared to others in the treatment condition. Also, non-partisans who 
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received the ―lesson‖ treatment are more likely to support the Open economy (by 12.2 points, 
significant at the 10%) and the Elimination of subsidies (by 13.9 points, significant at the 10%).  
Although overall the treatments have no effect on support for economic policies in 2019, 
they do have an effect among certain kinds of respondents. In particular, respondents in all 
subsamples presented in Table 3.5 (non-partisans, those who scored lower than 2 points on the 
financial literacy test, those whose educational level was no higher than elementary school, 
respondents older than 46 years-old, and respondents with an income lower than minimum wage) 
are more supportive for the Elimination of subsidies if they received the ―lesson‖ treatment (at 
the 10% level of significance), compared to their peers in the subsample who remain in the 
control group. Less financially educated, older and poorer respondents are more likely to 
approve the Debt payment if they read the ―economic lesson‖ piece. Non-partisans, less 
financially educated, and poorer respondents are also more supportive of the Debt payment if 
they read the piece about Venezuela, compared to individuals in the same subsamples in the 
control group. The interaction terms between the treatments’ dummies and the controls are not 
significant in the 2019 sample (not reported). 
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Table153.4 Heterogeneous effects of the treatments in 2018: OLS regression 
(Panel A) 
The table presents the effect of the two treatments – the ―economic lesson‖ and the ―case study‖ of Venezuela - on 
the approval of pro-market economic policies among different subsamples of the population. Panel A presents the 
effect on the elimination of the trade barriers, Panel B on the elimination of subsidies, Panel C on the debt payment. 
Column (1) presents the effect on non-partisans, column (2) on respondents scoring lower than 2 points on the 
financial literacy test, column (3) on respondents who haven’t finished high school, column (4) on respondents older 
than 46, and column (5) on respondents who earn less than minimum wage. The numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable: Approve open economy 
 Non-
partisans 
Low 
financial 
knowledge 
Low 
education 
Old 
respondents 
Low 
income 
 
"Venezuela" 0.148 0.113 0.258 0.204 0.088 
 
(0.064)** (0.055)** (0.104)** (0.073)*** (0.065) 
"Economic lesson" 0.136 0.141 0.094 0.257 0.062 
 
(0.064)** (0.055)** (0.101) (0.075)*** (0.063) 
Financial knowledge 0.072 - 0.127 0.069 0.034 
 
(0.018)*** - (0.035)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)* 
Male 0.037 0.007 0.017 -0.001 0.017 
 
(0.039) (0.033) (0.063) (0.044) (0.039) 
Macri partisan - 0.639 0.512 0.811 0.617 
 
- (0.05)*** (0.112)*** (0.059)*** (0.063)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Education dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
R
2
 0.045 0.094 0.109 0.160 0.071 
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Table 3.4 Heterogeneous effects of the treatments in 2018: OLS regression (Panel B 
and C) 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: Approve elimination of subsidies 
"Venezuela" 0.088 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.019 
 
(0.071) (0.06) (0.116) (0.078) (0.071) 
"Economic lesson" 0.110 0.028 -0.094 0.257 -0.040 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.113) (0.081)*** (0.069) 
Financial knowledge 0.083 - 0.159 0.090 0.053 
 
(0.019)*** - (0.039)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)** 
Male 0.021 0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.018 
 
(0.043) (0.036) (0.069) (0.047) (0.042) 
Macri partisan - 0.685 0.594 0.796 0.788 
 
- (0.054)*** (0.124)*** (0.063)*** (0.069)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Education dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
R
2
 0.049 0.094 0.105 0.159 0.090 
Panel  C 
Dependent variable: Approve debt payment 
"Venezuela" 0.140 0.094 0.068 0.101 0.113 
 
(0.066)** (0.058) (0.11) (0.074) (0.069) 
"Economic lesson" 0.136 0.060 -0.038 0.194 0.152 
 
(0.065)** (0.058) (0.107) (0.077)** (0.067)** 
Financial knowledge 0.030 - 0.087 0.061 0.035 
 
(0.018)* - (0.037)** (0.02)*** (0.02)* 
Male 0.007 -0.020 -0.003 -0.038 -0.049 
 
(0.04) (0.035) (0.066) (0.045) (0.041) 
Macri partisan - 0.558 0.526 0.798 0.575 
 
- (0.053)*** (0.118)*** (0.06)*** (0.067)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Education dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
R
2
 0.029 0.068 0.074 0.151 0.069 
Number of observations 1903 2431 644 1518 1708 
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Table163.5 Heterogeneous effects of the treatments in 2019: OLS regression (Panel A) 
The table presents the effect of the two treatments – the ―economic lesson‖ and the case study of ―Venezuela‖ - on 
the approval for pro-market economic policies among different subsamples of the population. Panel A presents the 
effect on the elimination of the trade barriers, Panel B on the elimination of subsidies, Panel C on the debt payment. 
Column (1) presents the effect on non-partisans, column (2) on respondents scoring lower than 2 points on the 
financial literacy test, column (3) on respondents who haven’t finished high school, column (4) on respondents older 
than 46, and column (5) on respondents who earn less than minimum wage. The numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable: Approve open economy 
  
Non-
partisans 
Low 
financial 
knowledge 
Low 
education 
Old 
respondents 
Low income 
  
"Venezuela" 0.056 -0.014 -0.022 -0.035 -0.030 
 
(0.054) (0.047) (0.091) (0.06) (0.054) 
"Economic lesson" 0.066 0.050 -0.019 0.088 0.007 
 
(0.054) (0.047) (0.093) (0.061) (0.055) 
Financial knowledge 0.035 - -0.055 0.035 -0.014 
 
(0.018)** - (0.034) (0.02)* (0.018) 
Male 0.031 0.035 -0.048 0.021 0.003 
 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.068) (0.044) (0.04) 
Macri partisan - 0.577 0.461 0.673 0.437 
 
- (0.063)*** (0.139)*** (0.07)*** (0.083)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Education dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
R
2
 0.024 0.055 0.047 0.069 0.029 
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Table 3.5 Heterogeneous effects of the treatments in 2019: OLS regression (Panel B 
and C) 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: Approve elimination of subsidies 
"Venezuela" -0.038 -0.040 -0.001 -0.056 0.090 
 
(0.059) (0.051) (0.093) (0.063) (0.058) 
"Economic lesson" 0.110 0.096 0.163 0.108 0.106 
 
(0.059)* (0.052)* (0.096)* (0.064)* (0.059)* 
Financial knowledge 0.099 - 0.070 0.092 0.035 
 
(0.019)*** - (0.035)** (0.021)*** (0.02)* 
Male 0.035 0.005 -0.030 -0.040 0.006 
 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.07) (0.046) (0.043) 
Macri partisan - 0.614 0.762 0.752 0.509 
 
- (0.069)*** (0.144)*** (0.073)*** (0.09)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Education dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
R
2
 0.049 0.057 0.082 0.100 0.045 
Panel  C 
Dependent variable: Approve debt payment 
"Venezuela" 0.113 0.084 0.019 0.037 0.109 
 
(0.055)** (0.048)* (0.089) (0.06) (0.056)* 
"Economic lesson" 0.053 0.115 0.022 0.108 0.147 
 
(0.055) (0.049)** (0.091) (0.061)* (0.057)*** 
Financial knowledge 0.098 - 0.040 0.029 0.020 
 
(0.018)*** - (0.033) (0.02) (0.019) 
Male 0.012 0.003 -0.051 -0.022 -0.033 
 
(0.04) (0.036) (0.066) (0.044) (0.041) 
Macri partisan - 0.533 0.584 0.657 0.373 
 
- (0.065)*** (0.136)*** (0.07)*** (0.086)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Education dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
R
2
 0.047 0.047 0.059 0.081 0.047 
Number of observations 1883 2261 639 1646 1715 
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3.3 Discussion 
 
In this chapter, I present the results from two identical survey experiments conducted on the 
same population at two different points in time. However, I do not observe an identical treatment 
effect. This example illustrates the importance of temporal validity - a special form of external 
validity. Social scientists employ experimental research designs to test their theories in random 
samples of the population to be able to make causal claims about relationships of social 
phenomena (McDermott, 2002). Survey experiments have become particularly popular among 
political scientists who study public opinion (Mutz, 2011). With this methodological tool, 
researchers can manipulate the nature, the amount, the order, and the framing of information that 
their subjects encounter. Thanks to technological advances, it is relatively easy and inexpensive 
to implement. Experimenters ―seek to establish causal relationships that are generalizable – that 
is, they try to maximize internal and external validity‖ (Barabas and Jerit, 2010). In general, 
experimental studies have a high degree of internal validity (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). 
However, their external validity is often questioned (Krupnikov and Levine, 2014). Compared to 
observational studies, experiments generate estimates of causal effects on ―a given population, in 
a given place and time‖ (Samii, 2016). The ultimate goal of social science is to generate 
knowledge that can be extrapolated to make predictions about phenomena in a different context 
in the future. With respect to my study, I seek to estimate the effect of non-partisan relevant 
information on policy preferences. 
Problems with generalizability may lead to biased conclusions because of publication 
bias. There is an important publication bias in survey experiments. Franco et al. (2014) identify 
221 survey-based experiments sponsored by National Science Foundation, which means that 
they passed a rigorous peer review process. They show that strong results are 40 percentage 
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points more likely to be published than null results, and 60 percentage points are more likely to 
be written up. Temporal validity is another factor that scholars have to consider when they 
aggregate knowledge on a topic. It is possible that survey experiments with strong results were 
conducted in conditions particularly favorable for a detection of a treatment effect. At the same 
time, other studies with similar research questions carried out in a different context might have 
never been written up or published. 
Dunning et al. (2019) implemented a novel approach to cumulative learning, when seven 
independent teams of researchers coordinated the design of experiments fielded in six countries. 
Their common research question concerned the role of information in democratic accountability. 
Previous studies ―paint a mixed picture‖ and ―suffer from limited replication, heterogeneity of 
measurement and design, and publication biases.‖ Dunning et al. (2019) find that, overall, 
nonpartisan information campaigns do not shape voting behavior. 
What kind of biases can compromise the external validity of experimental studies in 
general, considering that they produce estimates of effects ―on a given population, in a given 
place and time‖? Evidence from other fields demonstrates that results of similar interventions are 
context-dependent. For example, Vivalt (2016) analyzes estimates from 635 papers on 
development economics and finds a lot of heterogeneity. Getcher (2015) extrapolates the results 
of two experiments (about cash transfers and remedial education) derived in one context and 
applied to another and concludes that ―casual effects from one place may be only partially 
informative about effects elsewhere.‖ Allcott (2014) argues that ―site selection bias‖ can be a 
serious issue and demonstrates the problem through the results from 111 experiments on energy 
usage in the US. In social psychology, Paluck et al. (2018) summarize findings from 27 
89 
 
randomized field experiments on the effect of inter-group contact on prejudice. They conclude 
that the results are weaker and more context-dependant than previously thought.  
In survey experiments, site selection and population selection biases are less important 
because they are often conducted on nationally representative samples (Druckman et al., 2016). 
However, temporal validity remains an issue. Munger (2019) notes that ―academic research takes 
place as time advances‖, and ―knowledge decay‖ in a fast-changing world is potentially a large 
source of error. He discusses two mechanisms behind this error – dynamic composition of the 
population and a non-stable causal effect. In the first case, new subgroups may enter the 
population, and the heterogeneous effect of the treatment would be unknown for these groups, 
even when the sample is large and nationally representative. The second mechanism implies that 
the same individual responds differently to the same treatment at different points in time because 
of changing macro-conditions. The combination of the two features when the population is 
dynamic and the treatment effect is non-stable is also possible. Rosenzweig and Udry (2016) 
provide evidence for the second mechanism. They recognize that ―the world is stochastic and 
subject to aggregate shocks—weather shocks, technological shocks, price shocks—that can 
affect the entire population simultaneously.‖ They identify several high-profile studies in which 
estimates of the treatment effect from a single year were inflated because of pre- and port-
treatment conditions randomly different from the average. With more data, they are able to 
estimate the parameters of the distribution of aggregate shocks and the interaction between 
shocks and treatment effects.  
I suggest that the evidence presented in this chapter is also an example for the second 
mechanism. It is unlikely that the population composition has changed considerably in the 
interval between the two surveys. Both surveys were conducted in the same 30 localities in the 
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city of Buenos Aires, greater Buenos Aires area, and the Buenos Aires province. I applied the 
same sampling procedure. But it is likely that the aggregate environment changed in the interval 
between the surveys. The first survey took place during a time of economic growth; the second 
one was implemented during a recession.  
One of the reasons why the ―economic lesson‖ and the Venezuela ―case study‖ increased 
support for the Open economy and the Debt payment in 2018 but did not increase support in 
2019 might be the negative economic shock between the two surveys. The discrepancy between 
the results in 2018 and 2019 exists despite the fact that I had 45% more observations in both 
treatment and control groups in the second survey compared to the first. By the negative shock, I 
refer to the drastic change in the economic situation in Argentina between January-February 
2018 and January-February 2019. According to the World Bank, in 2017 Argentina experienced 
economic growth 2.7%. In fact, this number may be higher. First, the quality of statistics 
declined during the Kirchner presidency because the national statistic agency manipulated the 
inflation figures. Second, it is challenging to calculate economic growth precisely when inflation 
is soaring – small errors in inflation estimates lead to large errors in GDP estimates. Indirect 
measures demonstrate that Argentina’s economy had been rising in 2017. Specifically, new car 
sales grew by 27%, apartment sales (in the city of Buenos Aires) increased by 41%, and 
Argentines’ international tourist expenditures increased by 25%. In addition, inflation was the 
lowest in years (24.8%), real income went up, and the poverty rate fell to 25.7%. The real peso 
appreciated by 24% against the dollar during 2016-2017. An economic crisis, initially caused by 
external factors, started in the first half of 2018. The largest drought in 50 years reduced the 
production of export-oriented agricultural products. In addition, the prices for soybeans, a major 
export, were at the lowest levels in a decade. These factors resulted in trade deficit. Additionally, 
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investors returned to the US from emerging markets, including Argentina, after the rise in US 
interest rates. The result was the devaluation of the peso against the dollar by more than 100%. 
The Macri administration requested a loan from the IMF. In 2018, the economy contracted by 
2.5%. Inflation reached almost 48%, and real income declined. In 2019, unemployment rose to 
10% and the poverty rate to higher than 35%. 
There might be two explanations of the weaker treatment effect due to the economic 
crisis. First, even in the 2018 sample the variance explained by the treatments and controls is not 
very large (R- squared is equal to 9-13%). This means that there are many omitted variables in 
the models. The economic shock could have changed the effect of unobservable factors. Second, 
the economic shock makes factors that define attitudes towards policies noisier. On one hand, the 
effect of the treatment assigned randomly can be estimated without any controls. On the other 
hand, in relatively small samples control variables help to estimate the treatment effect more 
precisely. The fact that determinants of attitudes towards economic policies became noisier from 
one survey to another is manifested in the lower R-squared in the 2019 regression models when 
compared to the 2018 models. I conduct the same analysis with the data from two years. The 
dependent variables are based on the same questions. I use the same set of controls. However, 
the R-squared in the full specification with the Open economy as a dependent variable is 16.2% 
in 2018 and 12% in 2019, with the Elimination of subsidies 15.5% and 11.2%, and with the Debt 
payment 10.7% and 10.4% (columns (2) and (4) in Table 2.3, ch.2). The difference in the 
variance explained is even more dramatic in the regressions with the experiments’ dummies 
presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The R-squared in the regressions with the Open economy as a 
dependent variable is 12% in 2018 and 6.5% in 2019 (column (1)), respectively), with the 
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Elimination of subsidies 13% and 7.2% (column (2)), respectively), and with the Debt payment 
9.3% and 6.1% (column (3)), respectively).    
To test the possibility that the economic shock made the treatment effect weaker in 2019, 
I try to separate the subsamples who might suffer more or less form this shock. I estimate 
whether the treatment effect was lower/stronger than the average. For example, public workers 
suffer less because they have a secure employment and indexed earnings. I also look at 
subsamples according to individuals’ subjective evaluation of their past and present well-being. I 
do not find a statistically significant difference between the treatment effect in these subsamples 
and the entire 2019 sample. It may be due to the fact that there no sufficiently large number of 
observations in the subsamples to capture the difference. Also, it is not easy to separate 
individuals who were hurt more or less from the economic crisis.  
The economic shock might be one of the reasons why the magnitude of the treatment 
effect decreased from one survey to another. I discuss possible mechanisms how this shock 
makes the estimation of the treatment effect more problematic. Other explanations of the 
variability of the treatment effect and other mechanisms of the shock effect, if this is the reason 
of the variability, may exist. For example, one of the two treatments discusses the situation in 
Venezuela. It has changed considerably in the interval between the two surveys. The economic 
and political crisis in this country reached a level of international emergency. Juan Guaidó 
challenged Maduro’s presidency and declared himself president, although he was unable to 
unseat Maduro from power. During these events, the media coverage of news from Venezuela in 
Argentina increased significantly. This means, first, that it could be difficult to change opinion of 
the respondents in the treatment group because they already had information about the situation 
in Venezuela prior to the ―case study‖ treatment. Second, respondents in the control group were 
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also aware of the information provided by the treatment. Also, one of my dependent variables 
considers the repayment of the old debt left from the 2001 crisis. In the first half of 2018, 
Argentina had to apply for another IMF loan to stabilize its economy. This decision created 
controversy, since the IMF is not viewed favorably by many people in Argentina. This important 
consideration could influence respondents’ views in the treatment condition and make the 
treatment effect weaker. In sum, these events changed the salience of the survey treatment and 
the outcome in question. This change in salience might have made the estimation of the 
treatment effect more problematic. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an example of the identical survey experiments performed at two different 
points in time. The population in both surveys is supposed to be identical. However, the opinions 
they state in response to the survey questions differ, likely because of the change in macro 
conditions in the interval between the two surveys. In the first year their reaction to the survey 
treatment was consistent with the hypothesis. In particular, respondents in the treatment 
condition demonstrated higher support for two out of three pro-market economic policies. In the 
second year, I only partially observe this relationship. The signs of the coefficients are in line 
with the hypothesis, but the confidence intervals are wider compared to the 2018 results.  
Advances in experimental research in social sciences led to a ―credibility revolution.‖ 
Design-based studies produce internally valid estimates of relationships in social phenomena. 
However, how far scholars and practitioners can go in extrapolating results received in one 
context in the past to another context in the future is always an open question. Temporal validity 
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is a concern for survey-based studies that suffer less from other biases that compromise external 
validity (such as site selection and population selection biases). 
Rosenzweig and Udry (2016) note that causal effects might vary because of aggregate 
shocks that the entire population experiences. The implication is that ―the confidence interval of 
the estimated parameters from a single-year study does not provide guidance for external validity 
in a stochastic setting.‖ They suggest incorporating the intertemporal distribution of the external 
shocks that very likely widen the estimated confidence interval of the causal effects. 
Unfortunately, it is often not possible because of data limitations. For example, in my study it is 
challenging to estimate the effect of economic shock on individual well-being. Munger (2019) 
indicates that social scientists put too much emphasis on empirics and research designs. In his 
opinion, novel theorizing and qualitative research would help to better address the limitations of 
studies with low external validity. The results presented in this chapter suggest that it may be 
useful to describe the context in which the survey results are derived so that one can, at least, 
qualitatively evaluate whether they are replicable in another context. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Financial knowledge and policy-specific knowledge, income 
underreporting, and attitudes towards corruption 
 
In Chapter 2, I provide evidence that more knowledgeable people have different preferences 
compared to those who remain ignorant. Previous literature and my own findings presented in 
Chapter 3 suggest that people can be educated. People who are already knowledgeable may be 
different from the rest of the population in other aspects as well.   
The goal of this chapter is to discuss other outcomes to which financial knowledge may 
lead, beyond policy preferences. I hypothesize that financially educated people have a distinct 
analytical and ethical perspective on the reality surrounding them. Knowing that, we may have a 
better guess as to what traits people develop after knowledge acquisition. Specifically, I analyze 
their differences in three dimensions.  
First, I examine whether financially literate people have more correct factual information 
about economic issues of the day. Previous research finds that knowledge of policy-specific 
information changes political judgments about relevant issues. General political knowledge is not 
equal to knowledge of policy-specific facts (Gilens, 2001, Jerit and Barabas, 2009). I argue that a 
measure of knowledge in a specific domain, economic knowledge, is better suited than general 
political knowledge tests to estimate the effect of knowledge on expertise regarding the current 
economic reality. I ask a factual question about the dynamics of consumer prices. I investigate 
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the association between financial education and factual knowledge about inflation, controlling 
for party identification, the strongest predictor of answers to these types of questions. I find that 
individuals with a higher level of financial knowledge are more likely to give a correct answer to 
the question about inflation. This finding suggests that specific domain knowledge helps people 
process and remember correct factual information about current political issues, despite partisan 
identity. 
Second, I study the relationship between financial education and an individual’s 
propensity to misreport her income. This question is related to the literature that studies the 
relationship between tax evasion and ethics. One of the variables that shapes ethics is education. 
Researchers find evidence for both a positive and a negative effect of education on attitudes 
towards tax compliance. My analysis provides support for the first hypothesis – there is a 
positive correlation between financial knowledge and correct reporting of income.  
Finally, I investigate whether financially educated people are better at identifying 
structural problems for long-term economic development. Voters are often criticized for being 
superficial in their political decisions. I focus on one aspect of the lack of depth in their thinking 
– tolerance for corruption. I test whether financial knowledge increases the probability of 
choosing corruption as the main problem of the country. I find that, although financially 
educated people do not perceive corruption to be higher than do average respondents, they do 
think that corruption is the main problem of the country. However, this result does not hold when 
respondents face the economic crisis, even though an information shock related to corruption 
takes place at the same time. This finding sheds light on the empirical puzzle that political 
scientists try to solve – why people continue supporting corrupt politicians. When both economic 
problems and corruption come into play, people put more weight on the first factor, and this 
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holds true even for the most financially knowledgeable individuals. At the same time, in both the 
2018 and 2019 surveys, people with a higher level of financial knowledge select education, 
another driver of long-term economic development, as the main problem of the country. 
 
4.1 Hypotheses 
4.1.1 Financial knowledge and policy-specific expertise 
 
Previous research shows that both general political knowledge and knowledge of policy-specific 
facts play a role in shaping policy preferences. Some scholars investigate the relation between 
these two types of individual competences to see how they influence each other in order to better 
understand the mechanism behind the effect of knowledge on preferences. Achen and Bartels 
(2016) observe a curvilinear effect of general knowledge on policy-specific knowledge. They 
cite the results from the American National Election Study (ANES) in 1996, when the factual 
question about a highly salient political issue – dynamics of a budget deficit during the Clinton 
administration – was asked. During his presidency the deficit had fallen substantially. Among the 
least politically informed, both Republicans and Democrats were equally likely to say that the 
deficit increased as they were to say that it decreased. Moderately informed Republicans were 
less likely to give the right answer because they were informed enough to know that a Democrat 
was in office and, for the Republican voter, Democrats usually do a bad job. Even the best 
informed Republicans who are expected to be exposed to the important factual information of the 
day refused to admit the success of the political opponent. Bartels (2002) emphasizes that it is 
not political knowledge but party identification that is ―a pervasive dynamic force shaping 
citizens’ perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world‖. This driver for political judgments 
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is so powerful that people even ―create their own facts‖ to align them with their partisan loyalties 
(Achen and Bartels, 2016). Gilens (2001) does not break up the sample by party identification 
but also shows that many people who are fully informed according to general political 
knowledge tests may, nevertheless, be ignorant about policy-specific information. However, he 
demonstrates that policy-specific facts have a stronger influence on the change in policy 
preferences of respondents with higher levels of political knowledge in an experimental setting, 
possibly thanks to higher cognitive capacity. 
Throughout this dissertation, I argue that it might be useful to look at a different measure 
of knowledge when we aim to estimate the effect of knowledge on political perceptions. To 
answer correctly questions about the budget deficit, economic knowledge is more helpful than 
general political knowledge. Individuals with a higher level of economic knowledge are likely to 
be aware of what a budget is, what the deficit is, and what the consequences of large budget 
deficits are. When they encounter information about budget deficits, they better understand what 
an increased or decreased deficit means for the country’s finances. Because this information is 
meaningful to these individuals, it is easier for them to remember it.  
In general, knowledge reflects cognitive capacity (as well as education). The causal link 
in the relationship between knowledge and cognitive capacity goes in both directions. On one 
hand, people become more knowledgeable thanks to their higher innate ability, which includes 
cognitive skills. On the other hand, the better educated they are, the higher their cognitive 
capacity becomes (Anderson, 1995, Perkins and Salomon, 1989). With respect to economic 
knowledge, causal arrows are also likely to go in both directions. It becomes a self-fulfilling 
circle. People become more knowledgeable about economics because of their superior cognitive 
skills (if they have opportunities to learn). Once they become economically educated, it is easier 
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for them to process, analyze, and elaborate on economically related issues. This relationship 
should be linear in contrast with general political knowledge. 
H1: Individuals with higher scores on the financial literacy test have a higher probability to 
answer correctly factual questions about current economic issues. 
 
4.2.2 Financial knowledge and income self-reporting 
 
I study whether financially educated people are more likely to report their income honestly. This 
question is related to the literature about the relationship between tax evasion and ethics. 
Education is one of the factors that shape ethics. There is no agreement among scientists about 
the role of education in tax evasion and tax avoidance (McGee and Ross, 2014, McGee, 2012). 
Some studies find that more education leads to more averse attitudes towards tax evasion 
(Richardson, 2006, Kasipilai et al., 2003, Eriksen and Fallan, 1996). Others demonstrate just the 
opposite (McGee and Tyler, 2006). There can be several mechanisms at work behind the positive 
correlation between education and tax compliance. On one hand, more educated people tend to 
have more respect for the rule of law. They may better understand why it is important to pay 
taxes and how to pay them. They may also see the benefits of tax compliance because people 
with higher formal income have access to financial products, such as credit cards, consumer 
loans, and mortgages. They also do not run the risk of being caught and penalized for tax 
evasion. On the other hand, education is correlated with income, and people with high income 
are usually taxed more than poor people. They may resent paying higher taxes, especially if they 
are not sure that they are spent in an efficient way. In addition, their education helps them hide 
income and get away with it. My data are based on surveys, and I have no way to measure tax 
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evasion directly. Sincere income reporting and tax compliance are not equal to each other. 
However, there is research that shows that the same groups of taxpayers who underreport their 
income to tax authorities underreport it in surveys (Hurst et al., 2014). In this chapter, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Financially educated people are less likely to hide their income 
 
4.2.2 Financial knowledge and evaluation of the main problems of the country 
 
Voters are often criticized for judging, comparing, and electing politicians according to 
superficial perceptions that have nothing to do with politicians’ competence and effort. In the 
most extreme view, such voting behavior makes ―election outcomes, in an important sense, 
random‖ (Achen and Bartels, 2016). Voters’ myopia can be manifested in several ways. They 
may pick politicians because of their personality traits, such as appearance (Olivola and 
Todorov, 2010). They may punish and reward incumbents for events that clearly lay beyond their 
control, such as commodity booms (Campello and Zucco, 2016). Political scientists agree that 
the most sensible tool voters have is economic voting, but they overweigh recent relative to 
overall performance and let the rhetoric about economic performance shift their judgments 
(Huber et al., 2012).  
I focus on one facet of voters’ ignorance – tolerance for corruption. Empirical evidence 
suggests that corrupt politicians often become reelected, especially in developing democracies, 
although democratic institutions are supposed to limit malfeasance (De Vries and Solaz, 2017, 
Lederman et al., 2006, Warren, 2004). Political scientists suggest several mechanisms behind 
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this puzzle. Cross nationally, electoral rules and institutions may increase the difficulty of 
ousting dishonest politicians (Persson et al., 2003).  Historical or cultural traditions can lead 
some countries to be more corrupt than others (Treisman, 2000, Fisman and Miguel, 2007). 
Nations can be stuck in a corruption trap (Caselli and Morelli, 2004). On an individual level, 
most studies show that voters recognize corruption as a problem. However, they may not have 
enough information about it (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). Also, 
such politicians may be elected if they deliver other benefits, such as economic growth or public 
goods (Klasnja and Tucker, 2013, Breitenstein, 2019). There is mixed evidence in support of the 
latter, trade-off hypothesis, and it may have greater relevance for particular subsets of the 
population. Some studies show that the poor care less about corruption, possibly because they are 
too busy meeting their basic needs (Figuereido et al., 2011). Others suggest that the upper classes 
are more tolerant of corruption, possibly because they are less exposed to petty corruption but 
may personally gain from corrupt transactions on a higher level (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 
2013).  
I suggest another dimension in which individuals may differ in their tolerance for 
corruption – economic knowledge. Economic research shows that corruption is detrimental for 
long-term economic growth (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002, Gupta and Abed, 2002). I hypothesize 
that financially educated individuals have less tolerance for corruption than do average voters.  
This is so because financially educated individuals know that corruption is harmful to economic 
development, and they value politicians’ trustworthiness over delivery of public goods.28 
                                                          
28
 There can be other explanations of the choice of corruption as the main problem of the country. Perhaps an 
individual is concerned with the moral side of the problem or the role of special interest groups. The wording of the 
question does not permit discrimination between different explanations.  
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H3: Financially educated people put more weight on structural problems for economic 
development, such as corruption, than on recent economic fluctuations in their evaluation of 
country’s problems 
 
4.2 Empirical tests 
4.2.1 Expertise regarding current economic events 
I measure expertise regarding current economic events by using the answer to the factual 
question about inflation: ―Would you say that during January-June 2017 the inflation was higher, 
lower, or the same as in January-June 2016?‖ There is just one right answer to this question. The 
inflation in January-June 2017 was less than half the inflation in January-June 2016. Argentina is 
a nation with a long history of high inflation. For the last ten years inflation has always been 
above 20%. Not surprisingly, inflation is a regular topic in newspaper articles and everyday 
conversations. The sharp decline in inflation in 2017 was widely discussed by the media.  
I asked the question about inflation in the second wave of the panel in June 2017. Such a 
question would be typical for a test of knowledge of policy-specific facts. From previous 
literature we know that party identification is the strongest predictor of answers to questions of 
this sort (Bartels, 2002, Bullock and Lenz, 2019). When ―your‖ party is in office, inflation is 
perceived to be declining. If the office is held by an opponent, inflation seems to be on the rise. 
When I estimate the correlation between financial education and the evaluation of the consumer 
prices dynamics, I control for partisanship. 
103 
 
4.2.2 Income underreporting  
I examine the relationship between financial knowledge and an individual’s propensity to 
underreport her income in a survey. This question is related to the literature that studies the link 
between education and tax evasion. Most evidence comes from broadly designed studies with 
country-level characteristics as units of analysis or individual-level perceptions of the 
acceptability of tax evasion. My test is different in two ways. First, I use an individual-level 
measure of specific knowledge – financial knowledge. Second, instead of abstract questions 
referring to tolerance towards tax evasion, which may contain social desirability bias, I look at 
actual individual behavior. It is sure that underreporting one’s income in a survey is not equal to 
tax evasion. However, some research shows that those who distort their income for authorities 
also misreport it in household surveys (Hurst et al., 2010).  
To measure underreporting, I use the discrepancy between self-reported income and 
expenditures. Since Pissarides and Weber (1989) develop this tool, scholars regularly use this 
technique to estimate the size of the black economy and tax evasion.
29 
 
I ask several questions about assets, such as whether an individual owns a home, a car, or 
a computer, and has access to hot water and a sewage system. The survey also contains questions 
about spending. In particular, I ask whether an individual has traveled abroad over the last two 
years, whether she has a private medical insurance, whether she sends her kids to a private 
school, and whether she has problems feeding her family. In addition, I ask several questions 
about recent purchases. I include a dummy for social welfare receivers in the model.  
                                                          
29
 Pissarides and Weber (1989) use another important assumption, which is that formally employed do not avoid 
taxes, while self-employed can avoid them. I lessen this assumption because my goal is not to estimate the amount 
of underreporting but to rank individuals according to their probability of underreporting. Subsequent analysis 
shows that for the self-employed this probability is, indeed, higher.  
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I predict income for each individual with the following OLS regression: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i i i iIncome Male Edu Age Assets Spending Purchases Welfare                  
Next, I compare predicted income with self-reported income. My measure of 
underreported income is –εi. I multiply the residuals by -1, so that the larger values correspond to 
higher underreported income. Those individuals with the largest discrepancy (high predicted 
income and low self-reported income) are likely to underreport their income in the survey. I 
assume that respondents do not misreport their expenditures.  
I measure underreporting for the years 2018 and 2019, when I asked identical questions 
about assets, spending, purchases, and welfare benefits. As with the effect of financial 
knowledge on economic policy preferences that I discuss in Chapter 2, it is important to find a 
consistent relationship between financial knowledge and income reporting across the two 
surveys because of the particular economic conditions that preceded each survey. Economic 
research shows that when income rises there can be a lag in spending growth and vice versa 
(Brown, 1952, Ganong and Noel, 2019). The Argentine economy experienced economic growth 
before the 2018 survey. It is possible that formal income of financially educated people grew at a 
faster pace and that their expenditures have not caught up yet. This may explain the lack of 
discrepancy between their income and spending. If this is the case, this relationship would 
disappear in 2019, when the economy was in decline and disposable income decreased, while 
expenditures might have been maintained at the high level for some time. If financially educated 
people continue reporting income consistent with their expenditures, it is likely because they do 
not hide their income.  
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I rely on assumption that respondents do not misreport their expenditures. Hurst et al. 
(2014) who study income underreporting in surveys based on expenditures validate this 
assumption by conducting two robustness checks. First, they examine whether people 
unconsciously substitute their personal expenditures with business expenses in case of self-
employment. Then, some categories of expenditures would yield a different income prediction 
(because people may attribute to business their transportation expenditures for personal purposes 
and vice verse but are unlikely to classify their spending on food as business expenses). They 
find that income underreporting is nearly identical across different sub-categories of 
expenditures. Another possibility is that respondents consciously underreport their expenditures 
by the same percent they underreport their income. They divide expenditures into necessity and 
luxury good expenditures and analyze their structure with respect to income level. They do not 
find any irregularities and conclude that respondents are not likely to misreport their 
expenditures.  
4.2.3 Corruption perception 
Corruption was a salient issue in Argentina during the entire Macri presidency (2016-2019). The 
former president Cristina Kirchner is entangled in several court cases involving bribery, money 
laundering, and corruption. Supporters of Macri and Kirchner constitute two political camps that 
are polarized, to a great extent, over the issue of corruption. The name of the Macri party, Let’s 
Change, refers to that cultural change that includes intolerance to corruption. During Macri’s 
presidency, Argentina significantly improved its rank in the Corruption Perception Index 
published by Transparency International. It went up from the 107
th
 place in 2016 to the 66
th
 place 
in 2019. 
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I examine whether financially educated people give more weight to corruption than to 
current economic fluctuations in their evaluation of public affairs. First, I assess whether their 
perception of the level of corruption is different from the perception of an average respondent. In 
the 2018 survey, I ask a question about corruption perception: ―How many of the following 
people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them? 
 President and his administration  
 Members of the parliament 
 Government officials  
 Local government representatives 
 Tax officials 
 Police 
 Judges‖ 
The aim of this question is to find out whether financially educated people are more 
concerned about corruption. If this is the case, it is possible that their concern makes them give 
more weight to corruption rather than their understanding that corruption is the reason for low 
economic growth. I create seven dummy variables that are equal to 1 if an individual thinks that 
representatives of these executive, legislative, or judicial branches of power are corrupt. Then, I 
create a variable Corruption that is a sum of these dummies (with 0 as a minimum value and 7 as 
a maximum one). A higher score on Corruption reflects a higher perceived level of corruption.  
Next, in the 2018 and 2019 surveys, I ask a question about ―the main problem of the 
country‖. The list of options included inflation, unemployment, corruption, poverty, education, 
crime, or other. Respondents were instructed to mark only one option. Two shocks took place in 
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the interval between the 2018 and 2019 surveys – the economic crisis and a major corruption 
scandal (―the notebook case‖). I study how these two shocks shift perceptions of ―the main 
problem of the country‖ among the public in general and among financially educated. 
The notebook scandal refers to the revelation of the notebooks of the driver Oscar 
Centeno, who worked for public officials during the presidencies of Nestor and Cristina 
Kirchner. He frequently carried bags with cash to several public buildings and even the 
presidents’ personal house. He kept notes of these transactions in his notebooks which he turned 
over to journalists and investigators. This money was payments for bribes. Several businessmen 
mentioned in the notebooks confessed they paid bribes in exchange for government contracts.
30
  
Before and after the notebook scandal more than 20 public officials and businessmen 
from the Kirchners’ close circle were accused of embezzlement and arrested. Nestor Kirchner 
passed away in 2010. Because of her parliamentary immunity, Cristina Kirchner has not gone to 
prison yet but faces multiple corruption charges. She decided to run as a vice-president in the 
2019 campaign and invited Alberto Fernandez to be the Kirchnerist candidate for president.
31
 He 
was unknown to the majority of voters. Fernandez served as a head of the cabinet of ministers 
during the first term of Cristina Kirchner but left her government in 2008 criticizing her populist 
policies. He was not involved in the Kirchner’s corruption schemes. Fernandez won the 2019 
presidential election.  
 
                                                          
30 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45049064 
31
 https://www.wsj.com/articles/argentinas-fernandez-moves-from-unknown-politician-to-next-likely-president-
11566232733 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 The effect of financial knowledge on factual knowledge about inflation 
I measure the factual knowledge about relevant economic issues with the question about the 
dynamics of inflation. There is a linear relationship between the score on the financial literacy 
test and the probability of answering correctly this question about this highly salient economic 
issue. Graph 4.1 illustrates this relationship. Individuals with the maximum score on the financial 
literacy test are more than three times more likely to know the right answer compared to those 
with the minimum score. However, it is remarkable that even within the maximum score group 
only one third recognizes that inflation was low in 2017, given that there is no ―do not know‖ 
option.  
Table 4.1 displays the results of the OLS regression, in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy that is equal to 1 if a respondent chooses the correct answer to the question – whether the 
inflation was lower, higher, or the same in January-February 2017 than in the same period of the 
previous year (the inflation was lower). Controlling for a number of other factors, I find a strong 
correlation between financial knowledge and the expertise with respect to one of the important 
economic indicators. Each correctly answered question on the financial literacy test increases the 
probability of the right response to the question about inflation by 2.3 percentage points. There 
can be two mechanisms behind this relationship. On one hand, financial education is an 
indication of an individual’s high internal ability that helps her both acquire financial knowledge 
and answer correctly questions about current political events. On the other hand, financial 
knowledge itself helps an individual navigate through a complex political world, treat new 
information in an unbiased fashion, and internalize relevant facts.  
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Consistent with the previous literature, Macri partisans have a 27.8 percentage point 
higher probability to answer the question about inflation correctly than do respondents from the 
rest of the sample. This is likely due to their loyalty to the incumbent, not to their genuine 
knowledge. In their opinion, because Macri is in the office, he must be doing well. In this 
particular case, their preconceptions lead to the right answer.  
Notably, as in regressions with attitudes towards market-oriented economic policies 
presented in Chapter 2, education dummies are not significant in the presence of financial 
knowledge as an explanatory variable. The result suggests that what people have learned is more 
important than how many years they have studied.  
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Graph 4.1 The probability of the correct answer about inflation dynamics by 
financial literacy test score 
―Inflation was low in 2017‖ is the correct answer to the question ―Would you say that during January-June 2017 the 
inflation was higher, lower, or the same as in January-June 2016?‖. Financial knowledge is a categorical variable 
that ranges from 0 to 4.  
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Table174.1 The relation between financial knowledge and knowledge of policy-
specific facts 
The table presents the relation of financial literacy to the answer to the factual question about the dynamics of 
inflation. The variables are defined in Appendix 2. Age dummies include dummies for the following age categories - 
23-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-60 years, >60 years. Education dummies include dummies for the following 
educational degrees - Primary school, High school, College and Graduate school. Income dummies include 
dummies for the following income categories - $500-$1,000, $1,000-$1,500, $1,500-$2,500, >$2,500. The numbers 
in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels.  
Dependent variable:  
Inflation was low 
in 2017 
Financial knowledge 0.023 
 
(0.011)** 
Macri partisan 0.278 
 
(0.041)*** 
Male 0.015 
 
(0.025) 
Age dummies Yes  
Education dummies Yes  
Income dummies Yes  
R
2 
0.172 
Number of observations 819 
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4.3.2 The effect of financial knowledge on income reporting 
Next, I analyze the relationship between financial knowledge and self-reporting of income. The 
dependent variable is residuals calculated from another regression in which self-reported income 
(defined as a categorical variable that ranges from 1 to 5) serves as an explained variable, and all 
relevant observable characteristics related to individual consumption serve as explanatory 
variables. Then, I rank the residuals in descending order. They range from 1.86 to – 2.54 in 2018 
and from 1.97 to – 2.92 in 2019. This means that the largest discrepancy between income 
predicted by one’s expenditures and self-reported income is equivalent to approximately 2.5-3 
categories of income. The results displayed in Table 4.2 suggest that financially educated people 
are less likely to underreport their income. It is possible that individuals with higher financial 
knowledge are more likely to have formal employment. To control for this, I include different 
types of employment. The comparison base is the group of people who do not work 
(unemployed, retired, students, and homemakers). Compared to this group, public employees 
show the least underreported income. Professionals occupy the second place.
32
 People with 
formal employment in a private sector tend to report more income than business owners, given 
the same level of expenditures. Consistent with the previous literature (Pissarides and Weber, 
1989, Hurst et al., 2010), the self-employed are more prone to income underreporting than are 
people with any other type of employment. 
Controlling for all types of employment, financial education remains statistically 
significant in both the 2018 and 2019 samples. Apart from the type of employment that may be 
associated with financial education, the relationship between knowledge and the truthful answer 
                                                          
32
 Professionals are usually people with a university degree who earn their living from a specified professional 
activity. They include doctors, architects, accountants, lawyers, etc. In my sample, they may work independently, 
have  formal employment, or both.  
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to the question about income may be explained by a particular economic context in which the 
surveys took place. There is a positive association between financial knowledge and income. 
During good economic times, like in 2018, income rises, while expenditures may catch up with a 
lag. Those who benefit more from this situation, including the financially educated, report more 
income. If this explanation holds, then the effect of knowledge would disappear in bad economic 
times, like in 2019, when income declined though expenditures maintained at the same level for 
some time. However, the effect of financial knowledge persists across the two samples, although 
the magnitude of the coefficient is somewhat lower in 2019. Each correctly answered question 
on the financial literacy test reduces the income underreporting by 5.1 points in 2018 and by 3.8 
points in 2019. The coefficients for Financial knowledge are statistically significant at the 1% 
level in both samples, although the difference does not appear to be large in absolute terms. If 
one income category presents a change of $500, the coefficient of 5% translates into an 
underreporting of $25.   
My assumption is that people do not misreport their expenditures. If this assumption does 
not hold, another possible explanation for the association between financial knowledge and 
correct income reporting may be that financially knowledgeable people understand that if they 
underreport income, they also should underreport their expenditures. To mitigate this possibility, 
the questions about expenditures go first in the survey, so that respondents do not know that they 
will be asked about their income later. It may help reduce the misreporting of expenditures.  
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Table184.2 The relation between financial knowledge and self-reporting of income 
The table presents the relation between financial education and one’s propensity to misreport her income. 
Unreported income is calculated with the regression in which self-reported Income is a dependent variable and Male, 
Age, Education, assets in ownership, recent purchases, spending on medical insurance, private school, travels 
abroad, as well as welfare benefits are independent variables. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
Dependent variable: Unreported income 2018 Unreported income 2019 
 
(1) (2) 
Financial knowledge -0.051 -0.038 
 
(0.012)*** (0.014)*** 
Professional -0.342 -0.245 
 
(0.055)*** (0.06)*** 
Business owner -0.197 -0.195 
 
(0.063)*** (0.076)** 
Self-employed -0.084 -0.019 
 (0.045)* (0.051) 
Public employment -0.375 -0.228 
 (0.052)*** (0.056)*** 
Private employment -0.236 -0.161 
 (0.043)*** (0.049)*** 
Macri partisan -0.025 -0.078 
 (0.04) (0.057) 
R
2
 0.029 0.014 
Number of observations 3840 3725 
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4.3.3 The effect of financial knowledge on the relative weight of corruption  
In the analysis presented below, I separate two phenomena. One thing is to perceive high levels 
of corruption. Another thing is to identify corruption as the main problem for economic 
development. An individual may perceive that the level of corruption is high and still consider 
recent economic fluctuations more important than corruption. Alternatively, she may perceive 
that the level of corruption is high and give more weight to corruption than to recent economic 
fluctuations precisely for that reason rather than because she knows that corruption constrains 
economic growth. Another possibility is that an individual does not perceive corruption to be 
higher than does an average individual in the sample but believes that it is the main obstacle for 
economic development.  
First, I verify that financially educated people are not more concerned about corruption. 
There is no reason for them to be more concerned. One may say that financially educated people 
have more information about corruption scandals. However, the question does not test their 
factual knowledge about corruption but rather overall perceptions. In fact, previous research 
finds that more educated individuals and individuals with higher social status are less likely to 
think that ―everybody is corrupt‖ (Melgar et al., 2010). I also find a statistically significant 
negative correlation between the probability to answer correctly the factual question about 
another important issue, inflation, and a high level of perceived corruption (not reported). I 
report the determinants of the high level of perceived corruption in Appendix 4.5 (the question 
was asked in the 2018 survey). The coefficient of Financial knowledge is insignificant.   
Although on the baseline test of perception of corruption, financially educated people do 
not think that there is more corruption when compared to the rest of the sample, they do name 
corruption as the most important problem of the country in 2018. Moreover, among the listed 
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problems education is another potential driver for economic development in the long-run and one 
of the reasons for other mentioned problems, such as unemployment and poverty. Financially 
knowledgeable people also mention education as one of the main problems of the country 
(significant at the 1%). On the contrary, they do not think that issues related to the current 
economic conditions pose a problem for the country. There is a statistically significant negative 
correlation between financial education and naming inflation or poverty as the main problem 
(unemployment is insignificant). 
One might expect that the notebook scandal would make the corruption problem more 
salient. However, this is not the case, even for the category of financially knowledgeable 
individuals. In general, fewer respondents selected corruption as the main problem in 2019 than 
in 2018 (20.1% vs. 24.5%). The coefficient for Financial knowledge becomes insignificant in 
2019 (column (2) in Table 4.4), although the sign of the coefficient is consistent with the 
hypothesis. A likely explanation is that in that same interval between the surveys the economic 
crisis took place, and problems related to the state of the economy (inflation, unemployment, and 
poverty) became even more salient than corruption.  
At the same time, Financial knowledge remains statistically significant at the 2% level in 
the regression with education as the main problem of the country in 2019. With all other 
problems as dependent variables (inflation, unemployment, poverty, crime), Financial 
knowledge is insignificant (not reported). 
Because all estimates could become noisier due to the economic crisis, I append two 
samples to increase the power of the test (column (3)). Controlling for the year fixed effect, the 
coefficient of Financial knowledge is statistically significant. Each correctly answered question 
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on the test adds 1.2 percentage points probability that an individual chooses corruption as the 
main problem of the country (given that the average probability was 24.5% in 2108 and 20.1% in 
2019). The coefficient for Financial knowledge is also statistically significant at the 1% level 
with Education as the main problem as the dependent variable (not reported). 
This observation sheds light on the reasons for survival and success of corrupt politicians 
in developing democracies. Economic voting is a powerful tool that voters use to punish 
incumbents for bad economic times. They use it despite the fact that the main opponent is 
corrupt. When both drivers come into play, current economic conditions become more important 
to a larger number of voters, and the financially educated are not exceptions. This explanation is 
related to the argument that corrupt politicians can still deliver public goods or private gains to 
her voters, though the logical starting point is different. Voters’ main aspiration is to punish an 
unsuccessful incumbent rather than to support a corrupt politician who delivers.  
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Table194.4 Financial knowledge and corruption as the main problem of the country  
The table presents the relation between financial knowledge and the choice of corruption as the main problem of the 
country. On average, 24.5% of respondents selected corruption as the main problem in 2018 and 20.1% in 2019. The 
numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels.  
 
Dependent variable:  
Corruption problem 
2018 
Corruption problem 
2019 
Corruption problem  
Pooled 2018-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Financial knowledge 0.016 0.007 0.012 
 (0.006)** (0.006) (0.004)*** 
Male 0.021 0.027 0.024 
 
(0.014) (0.013)** (0.01)** 
Macri partisan 0.024 0.089 0.051 
 
(0.02) (0.023)*** (0.015)*** 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Education dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Income dummies Yes Yes Yes 
2018 year dummy 
No  No 
0.043 
 
(0.01)*** 
R
2
 0.013 0.012 0.013 
Number of observations 3840 3725 7565 
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4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discuss other attributes of financially educated people, beyond their policy 
preferences. I test three hypotheses – that people with higher levels of financial knowledge 
possess correct information about current economic events, that they do not hide their income, 
and that they give more weight to corruption than to current economic fluctuations in their 
evaluation of the country’s challenges. I find support for the first two hypotheses and partial 
support for the last one.  
First, I show that the probability of answering correctly the factual question about the 
dynamics of consumer prices rises with the score in the financial literacy test. This finding does 
not contradict the view regarding pervasive partisan loyalties as a driving force behind 
perceptions about current issues, including economic issues. But it does suggest that knowledge 
in a specific domain may also help citizens to learn and use relevant information about current 
issues. Second, I calculate the discrepancy between self-reported income and expenditures. I find 
that financially educated respondents are less likely to underreport their income. Finally, 
although financially educated people do not perceive a higher level of corruption than do other 
Argentines, they are more likely to think that corruption is the main problem of the country, as I 
show with the 2018 data. This result does not hold in 2019, likely due to the severe economic 
crisis that preceded the survey. This variability in results sheds light on why people elect corrupt 
politicians. Corruption does matter particularly for a group of sophisticated voters, but the state 
of economy is so important that even the most sophisticated shift their focus from corruption to 
the economic situation. 
In sum, financially knowledgeable individuals seem to be more responsible, informed, 
and ethical citizens because they possess correct information about current political issues, do 
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not hide their income, and distinguish short-term from long-term problems for economic 
development.  
 
4.5 Appendix 
Table204.5.1 Determinants of the high level of perceived corruption 
The table presents the relation between financial knowledge and the perception of corruption. Corruption is a 
categorical variable that ranges from 0 to 7. It is equal to 0 if a respondent thinks that nobody in the following list 
(President and his administration, members of the parliament, government officials, local government 
representatives, tax officials, police, judges) is involved in corruption, and is equal to 7 if she thinks that all of them 
are involved. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
Dependent variable: 
Corruption 
perception 
Financial knowledge 0.065 
 
(0.041) 
Male 0.175 
 
(0.092)* 
Macri partisan -1.378 
 
(0.129)*** 
Age dummies Yes 
Education dummies Yes 
Income dummies Yes 
R
2
 0.052 
Number of observations 3840 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Overview 
According to the democratic theory, citizens are considered empowered principals who, 
individually and collectively, form and articulate their preferences to agents. They hold them 
accountable if politicians are not responsive to their will. On one hand, we have abundant 
evidence that reality fails to match this ideal. Voters do not know much about what is going on in 
the political arena. Despite this mismatch between the ideal and reality, democratic theory 
remains central in our thinking about the functioning of democratic government because it is 
normatively attractive and we do not have a better one. On the other hand, we have evidence that 
people are capable of learning, and new information enlightens them. Therefore, more education 
sounds like a feasible solution to the problem of citizens’ knowledge gap.  
How knowledgeable people should be and what exactly they should be encouraged to 
know are fundamental questions in a democracy. It is not surprising that scholars of political 
behavior have attempted to estimate the effect of knowledge on political decisions. It is not 
obvious how to measure this effect. Since the dawn of public opinion research, general political 
knowledge has become a conventional measure of individual competence. Suppose one knows 
how many chambers there are in the parliament and the name of her senator, i.e. scores high on a 
general political knowledge test. Does this information actually help to form an opinion about 
costs and benefits regarding free trade or the degree of state intervention in the economy? The 
122 
 
logical path from this kind of knowledge to policy preferences is not obvious. Researchers 
acknowledge that general political knowledge is more a reflection of general interest in politics 
and the degree of one’s association with political groups than a base for the formation of 
preferences (Zaller, 1992). 
What if we measure the effect of information that directly addresses each particular 
policy? For example, if one is informed that unemployment is declining, she may be less willing 
to support protectionist measures to save jobs. If one learns that a number of women died 
because of illegal abortions, she may be more likely to be in favor of the legalization of abortion. 
If one is up to date about the dynamics of consumer prices, she may approve or disapprove her 
union’s wage offer. Numerous experimental studies show that policy-specific information shapes 
political judgments. Unfortunately, in the real-world setting, it often does not work in the same 
fashion. In general, voters are largely inattentive to this kind of information. Politicians compete 
for their scarce attention and sometimes are able to convey their agenda thanks to factors that 
usually have little to do with information trustworthiness. Voters learn what they want to learn. 
In sum, general political knowledge is too general, and policy-specific knowledge is too specific. 
In this dissertation, I build on the literature that studies the effect of information on policy 
preferences by suggesting a different measure of knowledge. During our life, we receive a lot of 
knowledge in classrooms and through experience. This knowledge is mostly accumulated 
through careful elaboration in a politically neutral context. Some of this knowledge may be 
useful for navigating a complex political world, including forming preferences regarding an 
infinite number of policies. If we find a way to separate relevant knowledge for a particular 
policy domain, we may estimate its effect on policy preferences. This variable can become an 
important consideration for governments, whose long-term goal is to increase the quality of 
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democracy, and for political groups, who seek to amplify points of connection with their 
followers. 
In this study, I use the Global Financial Literacy test as a proxy for economic knowledge. 
I estimate whether test results are associated with preferences for pro-market economic policies. 
This test was developed by Standard & Poor’s and used to evaluate financial literacy across the 
globe. In addition to this well established test, I adapt a 40-question economic literacy quiz 
developed by the Council for Economic Education into a shorter 4-question quiz. This test 
evaluates economic knowledge more straightforwardly. I use it as a robustness check for my 
main finding.  
Economic knowledge might be important for economic policy preferences because it 
helps understand relevant causal relationships in economics. This does not contradict the view 
that knowledge of policy-specific facts also helps shape policy preferences. It is likely that both 
types of knowledge are necessary to evaluate the effects of a policy. For example, to form an 
informed opinion about protectionist measures aiming to save jobs, it is useful to know the 
dynamics of an unemployment rate (a policy-specific fact) and how protectionist measures affect 
a labor market (economic knowledge). When it comes to the financial literacy test that also 
measures competence in math, I may find a relationship between the test results and policy 
preferences because the test may be a proxy for knowledge of policy-specific facts and 
understanding of the relevant causal relationships. Alternatively, basic mathematical competence 
may be needed in addition to policy-specific knowledge and understanding of causal links to 
evaluate the effects of a policy. 
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5.2 Summary of findings 
I asked respondents to complete the Financial Literacy test of three surveys I conducted in 
Argentina in the months of January and February in 2017, 2018, and 2019. In total, 10, 457 
individuals completed the survey in 30 localities in the city of Buenos Aires, Greater Buenos 
Aires area, and the Buenos Aires province during three years.  
My major goal is to assess the effect of financial knowledge on preferences for market-
oriented economic policies. In chapter 2, I test the hypothesis that a higher level of knowledge is 
associated with support for the elimination of trade barriers, elimination of subsidies, and 
integration into the world financial markets. I show that, unlike other measures of individual 
competence, such as political knowledge and knowledge of policy-specific facts, financial 
knowledge is not correlated with party identification. If it were correlated, it would be 
challenging to separate the effect of knowledge from the effect of partisanship, which is the 
strongest driver for policy preferences. An additional challenge is to disentangle the effect of 
knowledge from the effect of social status. The problem is that wealthier better-educated males 
tend to be more financially educated. They also are more likely to support pro-market economic 
policies. They may support such policies because they benefit from the free market or because 
they know that fewer distortions in the economy are beneficial for long-term economic 
development. I address the issue of confoundedness of explanatory variables by conducting my 
analysis in two different samples. I do not run just one cross-sectional regression. I argue that the 
economic crisis in the interval between the surveys of 2018 and 2019 converted the relative 
winners in 2018 into the relative losers in 2019. If the effect of financial knowledge is 
attributable to the winning status, I would find the correlation between the higher level of 
knowledge and support for market-oriented policies in 2018 but this relationship would decline 
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or appear in 2019.
33
 However, I observe this relationship in both years. I suggest that it is 
because of the effect of knowledge itself. Specifically, in the 2018 estimates I find that each 
correctly answered question on the test adds to the approval of the open economy and the 
elimination of subsidies 3.9 percentage points and to the debt payment 3.7 percentage points, 
with an overall level of support ranging from 29.7% to 38.3%. In 2019, more financially literate 
people are more supportive of the opening of the economy by 2.5 percentage points, the 
elimination of subsidies by 3.4 percentage points, and the debt payment by 4.1 percentage points, 
while the average approval varies from 27.3% to 34%. The winning status can be broken down 
into two variables – being a recent beneficiary of policies and being generally wealthy. My 
identification strategy, to a greater extent, addresses the confoundedness between financial 
knowledge and recent income rise but not so much between financial knowledge and general 
wealth. However, my data show that the support rate of the pro-market policies declined sharply 
from 2018 to 2019 among the groups with higher income. The income level captures both 
general wealth and recent gains. 
Economic knowledge measured with the adapted economic literacy quiz is also not 
correlated with partisan ties. However, a better score on the test is also associated with higher 
approval of pro-market economic policies. The quiz was included only in the 2019 survey. Each 
correctly answered question on the quiz adds 1.8 percentage points to the support for the open 
economy, 1.6 percentage points to the elimination of subsidies, and 4.2 percentage points to the 
                                                          
33
 I do not include the results of the 2017 sample because I did not have the same worded question about partisan 
inclinations and the 2017 conditions are similar to those of 2018. However, I find the correlation between financial 
knowledge and support for pro-market policies in 2017. 
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debt payment. The coefficients of the financial knowledge test results and the economic literacy 
quiz results are always significant at the 1% level of significance.
34
 
In chapter 3, I try to establish a causal link between knowledge and support for pro-
market policies. In this vein, I conduct two identical survey experiments in the 2018 ad 2019 
surveys. The experimental treatment is similar to that in studies that measure the effect of policy-
specific facts (Gilens, 2001, Bullock, 2011). I provide respondents in the treatment condition 
with information about the distortive incentives that subsidization and trade restrictions create for 
economic agents. They can use this information to answer questions about their attitudes towards 
pro-market policies recently implemented in Argentina during the Macri administration in 2016-
2019. There are two kinds of treatments – what I call a theoretical ―economic lesson‖, which 
includes a passage about the effects of policies implemented by the previous Kirchner 
government, and a ―case study‖, which includes a passage on the recent experience of 
neighboring Venezuela under Nicolas Maduro. I find that respondents who received the 
treatment are more likely to support two out of three economic policies in question in 2018. 
Specifically, the probability of approving the elimination of trade restrictions is higher by 8.3 
points and the debt payment by 9.6 points among those who received the ―economic lesson.‖ 
Those who read about Venezuela’s experience have a higher probability of favoring the open 
economy by 10.2 points and the debt payment by 8.8 points. In 2019, the coefficients of the 
treatment dummies do not reach the conventional level of significance, although their signs are 
consistent with the hypothesis. I observe this result despite the fact that I had 45% more 
observations in both treatment and control groups. I explain this variability in results by the 
economic shock that affected the entire population simultaneously. It is possible that the shock 
                                                          
34
 The only exception is the economic literacy quiz coefficient in the model, where the elimination of subsidies 
coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
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made it more difficult to estimate the treatment effect by somehow affecting unobservables and 
making observable controls noisier. 
In chapter 4, I ask the question whether there are other outcomes, beyond policy 
preferences, that may be relevant for the quality of democratic government and for which 
financial knowledge is also important. In particular, I test three hypotheses. First, I study whether 
financially educated individuals are more likely to follow economic news and internalize 
relevant information. I find an association between the score on the test and the probability of 
answering correctly the question: ―Would you say that during January-June 2017 the inflation 
was higher, lower, or the same as in January-June 2016?‖ (it was significantly lower). This 
probability is greater by 2.3 percentage points with each correctly answered question on the test, 
and this relationship is linear. This evidence suggests that fundamental knowledge helps increase 
policy-specific knowledge.  It becomes easier for financially literate people to pay attention and 
internalize relevant information about economic issues. Alternatively, they are correlated 
between each other but shape policy preferences through independent causal mechanisms – 
fundamental knowledge ensures understanding of causal relationships in economics and policy-
specific knowledge ensures understanding of a context. 
Second, I analyze whether financially knowledgeable individuals tend to report their 
income properly. Relevant literature produces mixed results. On one hand, people with more 
education are likely to respect the rule of law. They understand why it is important to pay taxes 
and where their taxes go. They understand that formal income give access to financial products, 
and they use these products. On the other hand, the more educated usually have higher incomes; 
therefore, they pay more taxes, which they may be reluctant to do. They also have knowledge to 
figure out how to avoid taxes. I find evidence for the former argument. For each individual, I 
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predict income based on her expenditures. Then, I compare predicted income with self-reported 
income and rank respondents by the magnitude of difference. I assume that those with large 
spending and low self-reported income are likely to underreport their income. Each correctly 
answered question on the financial literacy test reduces the income underreporting by 5.1 points 
in 2018 and by 3.8 points in 2019, with residuals ranging from 1.86 to – 2.54 in 2018 and from 
1.97 to – 2.92 in 2019. 
Finally, I examine whether people with a higher level of financial knowledge have a 
different perspective regarding problems that are detrimental for long-term economic 
development when compared to average respondents. I find that the financially educated are 
more likely to choose corruption as the main problem of the country in 2018 and less likely to 
choose inflation and unemployment. I interpret this result as their ability to distinguish between 
causes of long-term growth and indicators of short-term economic fluctuations. Two 
simultaneous shocks in the interval between the 2018 and 2019 surveys – economic crisis and 
―the notebook scandal‖ - revealed the degree of corruptness of the previous Kirchner 
administration. Other things equal, the information disclosed thanks to ―the notebook scandal‖ 
would make the issue of corruption more salient. However, even the most financially educated 
do not select corruption as the main problem of the country in 2019. This result suggests that 
when both the economy and corruption come into play, people find the former more important. 
At the same time, in both 2018 and 2019 they name education, arguably, another important 
factor for long-term economic development. 
In sum, I provide evidence that financial knowledge may help citizens follow the 
economic news, recognize the benefits of honest income reporting, and distinguish long-term 
economic problems from short-term fluctuations. 
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5.3 Suggestions for future research  
In this dissertation, I provide evidence of the strong link between financial knowledge and 
preferences for pro-market economic policies. I argue that this link might be causal because I 
find consistent results in different contexts and control for other important drivers for policy 
preferences. I use the measure of knowledge that is uncorrelated with the most important factor 
of policy preferences – party identification. In support for my main finding, I conduct the survey 
experiment and demonstrate that people may consume new information and change their 
preferences accordingly. However, alternative explanations of the relationship between financial 
knowledge and support for economic policies may exist.  
A field experiment would help to establish causality between financial knowledge and 
preferences for market-oriented policies. What kind of experiment could that be? For example, 
randomly selected individuals could be given a three-month course on basic microeconomics in 
which they are introduced to the main concepts of the field. 
In addition to solving the causality problem, a field experiment would also help to 
address the limitations of the treatments that I use in this dissertation. First, in chapters 2 and 4, I 
estimate the effect of financial knowledge. The treatment is the knowledge of basic financial 
concepts that an individual accumulated during her life and demonstrated at the time of 
completing the survey. I assume that such knowledge can be obtained in a classroom by taking a 
financial (and arithmetic) course or through life experience by dealing with banks and 
investment instruments. A young college graduate and an old investor can do equally well on the 
test, although the process of knowledge acquisition might be different for each one. It is unclear 
whether they would have the same values and perceptions that would lead them to take positions 
on economic issues. If it is just knowledge itself, their policy preferences would be identical. If 
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there are unobservable factors that accompany the process of knowledge acquisition, their 
positions on economic issues might not necessarily be the same. A field experiment would help 
to control the uniformity of the treatment.  
Second, in chapter 3, I provide respondents with a standard survey treatment – two short 
passages whose aim is to inform participants about certain topics. In my case, this information is 
about the consequences of leftist economic policies in Argentina and Venezuela. Survey 
experiments become popular among scholars who study public opinion because it is easy to 
manipulate the nature and the framing of information provided. Also, the treatment is not 
particularly different from the real world settings in which individuals encounter pieces of 
information from multiple sources. However, there is a drawback that often arises with this kind 
of survey treatment. It is possible that after having read a text, an individual learns and 
internalizes this information. It is also possible that she infers what kind of answers she is 
expected to give based on the information provided and does so in subsequent questions. This is 
the difference between learning and priming. In a cross-sectional survey, it becomes impossible 
to discriminate between mechanisms behind the causal effect. In a field experiment, the 
treatment and the measurement of the outcome (perhaps through a survey) could take place at 
different points in time. Moreover, since the delivery of the treatment itself takes time, the 
problem of possible priming would be solved because individuals are not immediately supplied 
with clues to the questions they are asked. 
Also, it might be interesting to look at other political outcomes for which financial 
knowledge might matter. The main outcome that I study in this dissertation is policy preferences. 
In addition to these, I look at the expertise about current economic issues, income reporting, and 
perceptions of the main problems of the country. In future research, it might be insightful to look 
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at the effect of knowledge on support for populism. Over the last years, the world is experiencing 
an unprecedented wave of populist politics both of the left-wing and right-wing type (Guiso et 
al., 2017). Scholars try to investigate the drivers of voters’ demand for populism. I suggest that 
financial knowledge might be one of the factors that could reduce preferences for populist 
politicians. The effect of knowledge can be studied in a specific country with a clear presence of 
populist movements or cross-nationally.  
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